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When building storage systems that aim to simultaneously provide robust-
ness, scalability, and efficiency, one faces a fundamental tension, as higher robust-
ness typically incurs higher costs and thus hurts both efficiency and scalability.
My research shows that an approach to storage system design based on a simple
principle—separating data from metadata—can yield systems that address elegantly
and effectively that tension in a variety of settings. One observation motivates our
approach: much of the cost paid by many strong protection techniques is incurred
to detect errors. This observation suggests an opportunity: if we can build a low-
vi
cost oracle to detect errors and identify correct data, it may be possible to reduce
the cost of protection without weakening its guarantees. This dissertation shows
that metadata, if carefully designed, can serve as such an oracle and help a storage
system protect its data with minimal cost.
This dissertation shows how to effectively apply this idea in three very differ-
ent systems: Gnothi—a storage replication protocol that combines the high avail-
ability of asynchronous replication and the low cost of synchronous replication for
a small-scale block storage; Salus—a large-scale block storage with unprecedented
guarantees in terms of consistency, availability, and durability in the face of a wide
range of server failures; and Exalt—a tool to emulate a large storage system with
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The primary directive of storage—not to lose data—is hard to carry out: disks can
fail in unpredictable ways [13, 14, 42, 55, 86, 92], and so can CPUs and memory [81,
93]. Concerns about robustness become even more pressing as scalable storage
systems like Google’s GFS [44], Bigtable [27], Megastore [15], and Spanner [32],
Facebook’s Haystack [17], and Amazon’s DynamoDB [36] become more complex.
For example, Google observes one corruption for every 5.4 petabytes of data scanned
in Bigtable [35]. What is worse, the consequences of such corruptions are hard to
predict: in the infamous 2008 Amazon outage, a single bit flip caused the entire
Amazon S3 service to be down for 8 hours [1].
Strong protection techniques, such as Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) [26,
31], can shield the system from unexpected and uncommon errors, but are usually ex-
pensive: the scale of today’s large storage systems magnifies the cost of these strong
protection techniques, severely reducing their applicability in practice. Therefore,
developers today are facing a painful tradeoff between robustness and scalability
and, in practice, they usually choose affordable solutions that can tolerate several
types of common errors, leaving the system vulnerable to uncommon errors with
large impact. To resolve the tension between robustness and scalability, my re-
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search explores new ways to provide modern storage systems with extremely high
levels of reliability at reasonable cost.
My approach to building robust and scalable storage systems utilizes an old
but powerful idea—separating data from metadata—in new ways. Many previous
systems protect metadata more aggressively than data because metadata in storage
systems is usually smaller and more important than data [2,5,23,88]. Consequently,
these systems usually offer stronger guarantees for metadata than for data. The
dissertation, however, shows that many distributed storage systems can actually
achieve strong guarantees for both metadata and data by applying strong protection
to metadata and minimal protection to data. This perhaps surprising result is based
on the observation that much of the cost paid by many strong protection techniques
is incurred to detect errors. Taking simple data replication as an example, if the
system only aims at tolerating machine crashes, then two replicas are enough to
cover one failure because the system can detect whether a machine has crashed or
not by using complementary mechanisms, such as timeouts. If the aim is to tolerate
arbitrary errors, however, then there is no obvious way to detect whether a machine
is faulty, and the system needs at least three replicas to outvote a single faulty
replica.
This observation suggests an opportunity: since the high cost of strong pro-
tection usually comes from error detection, if we can build a low-cost oracle to
detect errors and identify correct data, it may be possible to reduce the cost of
protection without weakening its guarantees. This dissertation shows that meta-
data, if carefully designed, can serve as such an oracle. Our approach involves three
steps: first, we design metadata so that it can be used to validate data integrity;
we then apply those strong and expensive techniques only to metadata, with little
effect on scalability; finally, we use such strongly protected metadata to identify
correct data. Despite its simplicity, we show that this approach yields data protec-
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tion with strong guarantees at minimal cost: in particular, we are able to employ
powerful fault tolerance techniques such as Paxos [61,62] and end-to-end Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (BFT) [26,31] at little additional cost over weaker alternatives such
as, respectively, synchronous primary backup and piecemeal checksums. In fact, in
some cases, providing strong end-to-end guarantees opens up new optimization op-
portunities that allow our hardened systems to significantly outperform the original
systems on which they are based.
I have applied this approach to build three different systems: Gnothi, a
small-scale storage system that can tolerate data loss and timing errors cheaply;
Salus, a large-scale block store that provides strong end-to-end guarantees for read
operations, strict ordering guarantees for write operations, and strong durability and
availability guarantees despite a wide range of server failures (including memory
corruptions, disk corruptions, firmware bugs, etc); and Exalt, an emulator that
allows researchers to test the scalability of today’s large storage systems.
• Gnothi: Efficient and available storage replication [Chapter 2]. Replication
is the key technique to guarantee data durability and availability in storage
systems and multiple replication protocols have been proposed to provide dif-
ferent guarantees with different costs: synchronous primary backup uses f + 1
replicas to tolerate f crash failures but it usually employes a conservative
timeout to perform accurate failure detection, which hurts the availability of
the system; asynchronous replication (e.g. Paxos) does not rely on accurate
failure detection, but it increases the replication cost to 2f + 1. My work
targets the following question: can one write data to only f +1 nodes and still
use a short and potentially inaccurate timeout without risking correctness?
This is well-known to be impossible in the general case, but in storage sys-
tems, leveraging the key idea of separating data from metadata allows me to
closely approximate this goal: by replicating metadata with Paxos and using
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metadata to identify correct data during failure and recovery, I show that it
is sufficient to replicate data on only f + 1 nodes. I have built a small-scale
storage system, Gnothi, based on this insight.
• Salus: A robust and scalable block store [Chapter 3]. Salus provides functional-
ities similar to those of Amazon’s popular Elastic Block Store (EBS), but with
unprecedented guarantees in terms of consistency, availability, and durability
in the face of a wide range of server failures (including memory corruptions,
disk corruptions, CPU errors, etc.).
Existing scalable storage systems usually give up certain robustness properties
for scalability, but Salus demonstrates that such trade-offs may not be nec-
essary. For example, scalable systems shard data and write data to different
shards in parallel to achieve scalability. This approach, however, does not
provide ordering guarantees between writes, and such guarantees are essential
to the correctness of certain applications, e.g. a block store. Salus addresses
this problem by separating data transfer from metadata transfer: data is pro-
cessed in parallel, while metadata, which carries information about which data
can be committed, is processed sequentially. If failures occur, Salus utilizes
metadata to identify data that can be committed. Salus addresses a second
key challenge: large-scale storage systems are usually composed of multiple
layers, with data replication performed at the lowest layer. In such systems,
using approaches similar to Gnothi to enhance the robustness of the replica-
tion layer is not enough, since middle layers are not replicated and can become
single points of failure. Salus shows that replicating such middle layers can
improve not only the robustness of the system, but also its efficiency when
disk bandwidth exceeds network bandwidth.
• Exalt: An emulator for evaluating large-scale storage systems on small-to-
medium infrastructures [Chapter 4]. A basic tenet of sound systems research
4
is to validate a design by implementing a prototype and running experiments
on it. Abiding by this precept when designing highly scalable storage systems,
however, is prohibitively hard: for example, Salus targets systems with thou-
sands of machines and tens of thousands of disks, but the largest affordable
experimental infrastructure I could use to validate my design included only
200 machines. The lack of large testbeds presents a fundamental challenge
to almost all researchers working on large-scale systems: even industrial re-
searchers who are within reach of clusters of the necessary size may not be able
to reserve them for large-scale experiments, since these clusters are a primary
source of revenue.
To solve this problem, I have designed an emulator, Exalt, that uses data
compression to reduce by two orders of magnitude the number of physical ma-
chines needed to validate a storage system of a given size. To achieve efficient
compression, I leverage the observation that the behavior of storage systems
often does not depend on the actual data being stored: this insight is at the
core of Tardis, a new synthetic data format that allows applications to quickly
separate data from metadata and achieve high rates of data compression.
By applying Exalt to existing large-scale storage systems, I improve the scal-
ability of a mature storage system by an order of magnitude compared to
its default configuration and unearth several performance issues that are not
observable at small scale.
Gnothi [104], Salus [106], and Exalt [105] have each been the subject of
conference publications: this dissertation not only expands on the original papers,
but also improves Salus and Exalt in both design and evaluation.
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Chapter 2
Gnothi: Robust and Efficient
Storage Replication
Replication, one of the core techniques to provide fault tolerance in storage sys-
tems, is sensitive to the tension between robustness and efficiency: 1) synchronous
primary-backup systems [27,34,44] require f + 1 replicas to tolerate f crash faults,
but they risk data loss if there are timing errors; 2) asynchronous full replication
systems [15,19,22,54] use asynchronous agreement [61,62] to ensure correctness de-
spite timing errors, but send data to 2f + 1 replicas to tolerate f crash failures and
thus have higher costs than synchronous primary-backup systems; 3) asynchronous
partial replication systems [63, 108] still require 2f + 1 replicas, but they only ac-
tivate f + 1 of the replicas in the failure-free case; the spare replicas are activated
only if some of the active ones fail. Although existing partial replication approaches
work well for small-state services, they are not well-suited for replicating a storage
system because, after a failure, the system becomes unavailable until it activates
a spare replica, which requires copying all of the state from available replicas. If
the copying can be done at, say, 100MB/s, then the fail-over time would exceed 2.7
hours per terabyte of storage capacity.
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This dissertation presents Gnothi,1 a new block storage system that simul-
taneously achieves robustness (correctness despite timing errors and availability de-
spite failures) and efficiency (f + 1 data replication). Gnothi replicates data to
guarantee availability and durability when replicas fail. To guarantee correctness
despite timing errors, Gnothi uses 2f + 1 replicas to perform asynchronous state
machine replication [61, 62, 91]. To reduce network bandwidth, disk arm overhead,
and storage cost, Gnothi executes updates to different blocks on different subsets
of replicas. The key challenge is to perform partial replication while not hurting
availability or durability. Gnothi meets this challenge by using two key ideas.
First, to ensure availability during failure and recovery, Gnothi separates data
from metadata so that metadata is replicated on all replicas while data for a given
block is replicated only to a preferred subset for that block. A replica’s metadata
keeps the status of each block in the system, including whether the replica holds
the block’s current version. Replicating metadata to all replicas allows a replica to
always process a request correctly, even while it is recovering after having missed
some updates.
Second, to ensure durability during failures, Gnothi reserves a small fraction
(e.g. 10%) of storage on each replica to buffer writes to unavailable replicas. While
up to f of a block’s preferred replicas are unresponsive, Gnothi buffers writes in the
reserve storage of up to f of the block’s available reserve replicas. Directing writes
to a reserved replica when a block’s preferred replica is unavailable guarantees that
each new update is always written to f +1 replicas even if some replicas fail. Gnothi
allows a tradeoff between availability and space cost: data is writeable in the face of f
failures as long as failed nodes are repaired before the reserve space is exhausted. To
guarantee write availability regardless of failure duration or repair time, conservative
users can configure the system with the same space as asynchronous full replication
1“Gnothi S’auton” (GnÀji sautìn) is the ancient Greek aphorism “Know thyself”.
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(2f+1 actual storage blocks per logical block). Given that in Gnothi replicas recover
quickly, analysis of several traces shows that a 10% reserve is enough to guarantee
write availability for many workloads.
Gnothi combines these ideas to ensure availability and durability during fail-
ures and to make recovery fast despite partial replication. In summary, Gnothi
provides the following guarantees: when an update completes, data is stored on
f + 1 disks; all reads and writes are linearizable [52]; reads always return the most
current data even though some replicas may have stale versions of some blocks; the
system is available for reads as long as there are at most f failures; and the system is
available for writes as long as there are at most f failures and failed replicas recover
or are replaced before the reserve buffer is fully consumed by new updates.
We implement Gnothi by modifying the ZooKeeper server [54]. Gnothi pro-
vides a block store API, and it can be used like a disk: users can mount it as a block
device and create and use a filesystem on it. We evaluate Gnothi’s performance
both in the common case and during failure recovery and compare it with Gaios,
a state-of-the-art Paxos-based block replication system [19]. The evaluation shows
that Gnothi’s write throughput can be 40%-64% higher than our implementation
of a Gaios-like system while retaining Gaios’s excellent read scalability. We also
find that for systems with large amounts of state, separating data and metadata
significantly improves recovery compared to traditional state machine replication.
Unlike standard Paxos-based systems, Gnothi ensures that a recovering replica will
eventually catch up regardless of the rate at which new requests are processed, and
unlike previous partial replicated systems, Gnothi remains available even while large
amounts of state are rebuilt on recovering replicas.
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2.1 Design
2.1.1 Interface and Model
Gnothi targets disk storage systems within small clusters of tens of machines. Be-
cause linearizability is composable, it is possible to scale Gnothi by composing mul-
tiple small clusters: this is discussed in Chapter 3.
Gnothi provides an interface similar to a disk drive: there is a fixed number
of blocks with the same size, and applications can read or write a whole block.
Block size is configurable. Our experiments use sizes ranging from 4KB to 1MB,
but smaller or larger sizes are possible.
Gnothi provides linearizable reads and writes across different clients. Fur-
thermore, if a client has multiple outstanding requests, Gnothi can be configured so
that they will be executed in the order they were issued.
Gnothi is designed to be safe under the asynchronous model: the network
can drop, reorder, modify, or arbitrarily delay messages. Therefore, Gnothi makes
no assumption about the maximum communication delay between nodes, and thus
it is impossible to detect whether a node has failed or it is just slow. Gnothi provides
the same guarantees as previous asynchronous replicated state machines (RSMs):
the system is always safe (all correct replicas process the same sequence of updates),
but it is only live (the system guarantees progress) during periods when the network
is available and message delivery is timely. Gnothi uses 2f + 1 replicas to tolerate
f omission/crash failures. Commission/Byzantine failures are not considered.
2.1.2 Architecture
As shown in Figure 2.1, Gnothi uses the Replicated State Machine (RSM) ap-
proach [91]: agreement modules on different replicas work together to guarantee





















Slice 0 and 2
Slice 1
Figure 2.1: Data and metadata flow for a request to update a block in slice 1.
quests are then logged and executed, and replies are sent to the client.
Gnothi splits metadata and data. Metadata is updated using state machine
replication and is replicated at all 2f + 1 replicas, but data is replicated to just
f + 1 replicas. A replica marks a data block as COMPLETE or INCOMPLETE
depending on whether or not the replica holds what it believes to be the block’s
current version.
• A block is COMPLETE at a replica if the replica stores a version of the
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a. Write Operations when no failures occur b. Read Operations when no failures occur
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Figure 2.2: Gnothi protocols. We only show the logical flow of data and metadata in
the figure, not actual messages. Consensus messages among servers are omitted, and
we only show the flow and state for a single block. Multiple blocks are distributed
among servers, so that each replica holds both COMPLETE and INCOMPLETE
blocks.
• A block is INCOMPLETE at a replica if the replica’s metadata records a
version of the block that is more recent than the latest data stored at the
replica for that block.
Note that the concepts of COMPLETE and INCOMPLETE are different
from those of Fresh and Stale. A block is Fresh if it contains the data of the latest
update to that block and is Stale if it contains a previous version. In Gnothi,
a COMPLETE block can be Stale. For example, this can happen when a node
becomes disconnected and misses both the data and metadata update. Section 2.2.3
discusses how to avoid reading a Stale block.
When no failures or timeouts occur, Gnothi maps each block n to one of 2f+1
slices and stores each slice on f + 1 preferred replicas, from replica n%(2f + 1) to
replica (n− f)%(2f + 1). This ensures that the 2f + 1 slices are evenly distributed
among different replicas, and that each replica is in the preferred quorum of f + 1
different slices, which are the PREFERRED slices for that replica.
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When failures or timeouts occur, a data block might be pushed to reserve
storage on replicas out of its preferred quorum. We will show the detailed protocol
later.
To simplify the description, we say that a block is PREFERRED at a replica
if the replica is a member of the block’s preferred quorum. Otherwise, we say that
the block is RESERVED at that replica. We similarly say a request (read, write) is
PREFERRED/RESERVED at a replica if it accesses a PREFERRED/RESERVED
block at the replica.
Each replica allocates a preferred storage to store the data of PREFERRED
writes, a reserve storage to store the data of RESERVED writes, and a relatively
small metadata storage for each block’s version and status.
2.1.3 Protocol Overview
This section presents an overview of Gnothi’s protocol and compares Gnothi with
the asynchronous full replication used by Paxos [61, 62], the asynchronous partial
replication used by Cheap Paxos [63], and the state-of-the-art Paxos-based block
replication system Gaios [19].
Figure 2.2.a shows a write operation when no failures occur. In Paxos and
Gaios, a write operation is sent to, and executed on, all correct replicas. This seems
redundant if our goal is to tolerate one failure: a natural idea is to send the write
requests to two replicas first, and if they do not respond in time, try the third
one [4]. Cheap Paxos adopts this idea by activating two replicas and leaving the
other one as a cold backup [63,108]. Gnothi incorporates a similar idea, but it still
sends the metadata to the third replica, which executes the request by marking the
corresponding data block as INCOMPLETE. Later, we will see that this metadata
is critical to reducing the cost of failure and recovery.
Figure 2.2.b shows a read operation when no failures occur. In Paxos, the
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read is sent to all replicas and the client waits for two replies. The figure shows
a common optimization that lets one replica send back the full reply and lets the
others send back a hash or version number [26]. By using similar optimizations for
its writes, Cheap Paxos executes the read on only two replicas. Gaios introduces
a protocol that allows reads to execute on only one replica while still ensuring
linearizability, and Gnothi uses Gaios’s read protocol, with a slight modification to
avoid reading INCOMPLETE blocks.
Figure 2.2.c shows what happens when one replica fails. Paxos and Gaios
do not need special handling since the remaining two replicas hold all data. Cheap
Paxos brings online the cold backup, which needs to fetch the data from the live
replica: the system is unavailable until this transfer finishes, possibly for a long time
if the system stores a large amount of data. Gnothi too needs no special handling,
the third replica knows whether a block it stores is COMPLETE or not, so it can
safely continue processing read requests by serving reads of COMPLETE blocks
and redirecting reads of INCOMPLETE ones to the other replica. And it can also
continue processing writes whose block belongs to the failed replica by storing data
in its reserve storage.
Figure 2.2.d shows a write operation when a replica is unavailable. Paxos,
Gaios, and Cheap Paxos do not need any special handling. For Gnothi, a replica
may receive a RESERVED write and store it in its reserve storage to ensure that
writes only complete when at least two nodes store their data. Read operations in
this case are not different from those when no failure occurs.
Figure 2.2.e shows how recovery works when a replica that has missed some
writes recovers or when a new replica replaces a lost one. Paxos and Gaios both
need to fetch all missing data before processing new requests at the recovered replica.
Cheap Paxos can just leave the recovered replica as the cold backup and does not
need any special handling. Gnothi performs a two-phase recovery when a failed
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replica recovers.
In the first phase, the recovering replica fetches missing metadata from the
other replicas. Since metadata is updated on all replicas, this phase of recovery
proceeds as in a traditional RSM. The recovering replica then proceeds to store
and mark as COMPLETE all the data blocks it has received; all remaining blocks
referred in the received metadata are marked as INCOMPLETE. By the end of the
first phase, the recovering replica can serve write requests even though full recovery
is not complete yet: at this point the system stops consuming additional reserve
storage on other replicas. Since the size of metadata is small, this phase is fast, and
thus it is often not necessary to allocate a large reserve storage.
In the second phase, the recovering replica re-replicates all missing or stale
PREFERRED blocks. Gnothi performs this step asynchronously, so it can balance
recovery bandwidth and execution bandwidth while still guaranteeing progress. De-
pending on the status of the recovering replica, there are two possible cases here:
if all data on disk is lost, the recovering replica needs to rebuild its whole disk; if
the data on disk is preserved, the recovering replica just needs to fetch the updates
it missed during its failure. Note that Gnothi can continue processing reads and
writes to all blocks during the second phase. If a node receives a read request for
an INCOMPLETE block, it rejects the request, and the client retries with another
replica.
2.1.4 Summary
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the costs of Gnothi and of previous work. In read
cost, write cost, and space, Gnothi dominates Paxos, Gaios, and Cheap Paxos,
improving on each in at least one dimension and approximating most in the others.
For recovery and availability, Gnothi can perform the heavy data transfer in the
background concurrently with serving new requests, while in Paxos and Gaios, the
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recovering replica must wait for the transfer to finish before serving requests, and
in Cheap Paxos, the whole system must halt until the transfer completes.
Protocol Write Read Space
Paxos 2f+1 2f+1 2f+1
Gaios 2f+1 1 2f+1
Cheap Paxos f+1 f+1 f+1+f (Cold)
Gnothi f+1 1 f+1+∆f 0 < ∆ ≤ 1
Table 2.1: Cost of Gnothi and previous work when there are no failures.
Protocol Failure Recovery (Disk survived) Recovery (Disk replaced)
Paxos 0 O(NB) O(S)
Gaios 0 O(NB) O(S)
Cheap Paxos O(S) (Blocking) 0 0
Gnothi 0 O(Nb)+O(NB) O(Nb)+O( f+1
2f+1
S)
Table 2.2: Cost of Gnothi and previous work during failure and recovery. S is
the total storage space, N is the number of unique updated blocks missed by the
recovering replica, B is the block size, and b is the metadata size for each block.
2.2 Detailed Design
This section presents in detail how Gnothi stores and accesses data and metadata,
and how it performs recovery after a replica fails.
2.2.1 Data and Metadata
Gnothi splits the storage space into 2f + 1 slices, with each replica in the preferred
quorum of f + 1 slices. A replica stores the data of its f + 1 PREFERRED slices
in its preferred storage, and allocates space for f RESERVED slices in its reserve
storage. When all replicas are available, blocks are always written to preferred
storage, but when some replicas are not available, blocks are stored in the reserve
storage of replicas outside the block’s preferred quorums.
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If the per-slice size of preferred and reserve storage are the same, then the
system can remain available indefinitely even if f replicas fail, but at the cost of
2f + 1 physical blocks for each logical block. In Section 2.2.5, we will show that,
given Gnothi’s fast recovery, a much smaller reserve storage is likely to suffice for
many workloads. For now, let us assume that preferred and reserve storage have
the same per-slice size.
In processing updates, Gnothi separates data and metadata. The data is
carried in a PrepareData message, while the corresponding metadata is carried in a
WriteData message; we will detail the messages’ format in the following subsections.
A client first sends PrepareData; upon receiving the message, a replica first logs it
to disk and then stores it in a buffer until it receives the corresponding WriteData
and can perform the actual write. We call the buffer the PrepareData buffer in
the following sections. To avoid overflowing a replica’s PrepareData buffer, Gnothi
sets an upper bound on how many outstanding PrepareData requests a single client
can buffer. If a replica finds its PrepareData buffer for a client is full, it stops
receiving messages from that client until the buffer has room. Once it knows that
the PrepareData has been stored by enough replicas, the client proceeds to send
the WriteData message. Replicas run an agreement protocol to guarantee that
WriteData messages are processed in the same order by all correct replicas.
It would be tempting for the clients to send PrepareData and WriteData
messages in parallel. However, this optimization does not work, because a client
failure may leave the system in a state where metadata (WriteData) is fully repli-
cated while data (PrepareData) is completely lost: each replica would mark the
corresponding block as INCOMPLETE, and the system would be unable to process
read requests for this block. Sending PrepareData before WriteData—the approach
used in Gnothi—eliminates this problem, but it introduces the possibility of a new
problem of its own: a buffered PrepareData on a replica may never be written
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to its target location. For example, a client could fail after sending the Prepare-
Data message but before sending the WriteData message. To garbage-collect such
buffered PrepareDatas, a client includes a client sequence number with each Pre-
pareData message and WriteData message it sends, and a replica discards a buffered
PrepareData if it processes a WriteData message with a higher sequence number.
When the client fails and recovers, it sends to all replicas a special “new epoch”
command. Replicas process the new epoch command using the same agreement
protocol used to order WriteData messages: hence, by the time replicas enter a new
epoch, they have processed the same sequence of WriteData messages. Once the
new epoch command completes, all replicas can discard all buffered PrepareDatas
in the previous epoch. Notice that if the failed client does not recover, the replica
cannot discard buffered PrepareDatas; in asynchronous replication, it is impossible
to know whether a client has permanently failed or is just slow. If the cost of a
few megabytes per permanently-failed client is too high, the system can rely on an
administrator or on a very long timeout (say, one day) to detect and remove the
permanently failed client and clear its buffer.
Gnothi keeps metadata for each block: an 8-byte version number assigned by
agreement to identify the block’s last update, and an 8-byte requestID to connect
the block to the PrepareData message. The version number and requestID are
primarily used in failure recovery: we will show why Gnothi needs them and how
to use them later. In addition, each replica keeps one bit for each block to identify
whether or not the block is COMPLETE on the replica.
2.2.2 Write Protocol
The write protocol is illustrated in Figure 2.3:
1 A client sends PrepareData(requestID, block data) to f+1 replicas, using























Figure 2.3: Write Protocol
targets the block’s preferred quorum, but if a timeout occurs, the client tries other
replicas. To prevent the client’s network from becoming a bottleneck for sequential
access we use chain replication [47, 102]: the client sends the data to one replica
which forwards it to the next, and so on.
2 A replica receiving the PrepareData puts it into a PrepareData buffer,
logs it to disk, and sends a PrepareDataAck(requestID) to the client.
3 The client waits for f + 1 PrepareDataAcks. If there is a timeout, the
client repeats Step 1 , choosing some other replicas. When the network is available
and message delivery is timely, this step is guaranteed to terminate as long as at
least f + 1 replicas are capable of processing requests.
4 The client sends WriteData(requestID, block number) through the agree-
ment protocol so that all replicas receive the same sequence of write commands.
Gnothi uses code from ZooKeeper for agreement, but other Paxos-like protocols [19,
31] could be used.
5 After agreement, when a replica receives a WriteData message it updates
its metadata storage and tries to find the corresponding PrepareData in the Pre-
pareData buffer by using the requestID as the identifier. There are three possible
cases:
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5.1 The replica has both the WriteData and the corresponding PrepareData
messages, and this is a PREFERRED write for the replica. The replica then writes
the data to its preferred storage and marks the corresponding block as COMPLETE.
Note that the write operation can be performed asynchronously, because the Pre-
pareData message is already logged to disk in Step 2 : as shown in Section 2.4.2,
writing asynchronously can improve the throughput of the system under random
workloads because it gives the disks more opportunities to reorder requests.
5.2 The replica has the WriteData message but no corresponding Prepare-
Data message. The replica then marks the corresponding block as INCOMPLETE.
5.3 The replica has both the WriteData and the corresponding PrepareData
messages, and this is a RESERVED write for the replica. The replica then writes
the data to the reserve storage and marks the corresponding block as COMPLETE.
This case happens only when there are unavailable or slow replicas, so it is not
shown in Figure 2.3.
In all cases, the replica sends a WriteAck(requestID) back to the client.
6 The client waits for f + 1 WriteAcks. If there is a timeout, the client
repeats Step 4 . If the WriteData has already been processed, the replicas send a
WriteAck reply [26]; otherwise, they process the write request. Assuming there are
at least f + 1 functioning replicas, the client is guaranteed to get enough WriteAcks
eventually.
To argue correctness, we observe that Step 3 guarantees that PrepareData
is received by at least f +1 replicas and thus will not be lost; the agreement protocol
guarantees that WriteData is eventually received by all correct replicas and thus will
not be lost; and the agreement protocol provides the write linearizability guarantee.
Notice that in Step 6 , WriteAcks may not always come from the same nodes that
stored data and sent PrepareDataAcks in Step 2 , but this is not a problem since
the system is still protected against f failures. If one of the nodes storing data is
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slow, temporarily unavailable, or crashed but can recover locally, it will catch up
with others using standard techniques [61, 62] and process the WriteData, so that
the write will survive even if another node fails. Conversely, if a node permanently
loses its data, the recovery protocol must restore full redundancy by fetching the
failed node’s state from the remaining replicas, but this case is no different whether
the node that received the PrepareData and then permanently crashed did so before
or after sending a WriteAck.
2.2.3 Read Protocol
For reads, we use the Gaios read protocol [19], modified slightly to handle INCOM-
PLETE blocks. (Steps 2 - 4 below are the same as described for Gaios):
1 A client sends a Read (block number, replica ID) to the current agreement
leader node, stating that it wants to read that block from a specific target replica.
Usually, the target is the first replica in the block’s preferred quorum.
2 The leader buffers the Read request and queries all other replicas: “Am
I still the leader?”
3 If the leader receives at least f “Yes” responses, it continues. Otherwise,
it does nothing. This can happen if a slow replica still believes to be the leader,
while enough other replicas have already moved on. In this case, the client will
timeout, restart from Step 1 , and try another replica as the leader.
4 The leader attaches a version number to the Read and sends it to the
target replica specified in the request. The version number is set to the number of
write requests already agreed. This number is used in Step 5 to ensure that the
target replica does not read stale data.
5 The target replica waits until the write with the specified version number
is executed, and then it executes the Read. This synchronization prevents a slow
replica from sending stale data to the client. There are two cases to consider:
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5.1 The corresponding block is COMPLETE : the target replica then sends
the data to the client.
5.2 The corresponding block is INCOMPLETE : the target replica sends an
INCOMPLETE reply to the client. This allows the client to move to the next replica
quickly, instead of waiting for a timeout.
6 If the client receives the data, it finishes the Read. If it receives INCOM-
PLETE or times out, it chooses another replica and restarts from Step 1 . The
client chooses the target replica in round-robin fashion starting with the preferred
quorum, so that all replicas will be tried.
When no failures or timeouts occur, Step 5.1 will always happen, since the
client chooses a node from the preferred quorum as the target. When failures or
timeouts occur, the client may try some other replicas, but during a period with
timely message delivery, it will eventually succeed since some replica must hold the
data.
Note that if the client issues a read and then a write to the same block before
the read returns, the read can return the result of the later write. Gnothi assumes
this is an acceptable behavior for block drivers [19], but a client can prevent it by
blocking the later write when there is an outstanding read operation to the same
block.
2.2.4 Failure and Recovery
Gnothi performs no special operations when replicas fail. A client may timeout in
the read or write protocol and retry using some other replicas, or write data to some
replicas not in the preferred quorum, which will store these RESERVED writes in
their reserve storage.
Recovering a failed replica begins with replaying the replica’s log. If the disk
is damaged or the machine is entirely replaced, this step may fail but correctness
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is not affected. What cannot be recovered from the log is fetched from the other
replicas in two phases: first to be restored is the metadata, and then any data
missing from the failed replica’s preferred slices. The recovering replica can process
new requests once the first phase is complete, and it is fully recovered and no longer
counts against our f threshold when the second phase is complete.
Phase 1: Metadata recovery
Gnothi replicates metadata on each node, so metadata recovery proceeds as it would
in traditional RSMs: the recovering replica sends to the primary the last version
number it is aware of, to which the primary replies with a list of metadata records, if
any, with higher version numbers. Besides the version number, each of these records
includes a block number and a requestID.
For each received record, the replica then checks if it holds in its buffer a
PrepareData with the same requestID: if so, it executes the write request and marks
the block as COMPLETE. This check handles the case when a replica receives a
PrepareData but fails before receiving the corresponding WriteData. In this case,
the recovering replica should finish executing the write request, and the requestID
is necessary to connect a PrepareData to its block. If there is no PrepareData in
the buffer with the same requestID, the replica simply marks the block as INCOM-
PLETE.
When metadata recovery is complete, it is safe for the replica to process new
requests, even though it may have some INCOMPLETE blocks. An update will
overwrite the INCOMPLETE block, and a read will be redirected to other replicas
with the COMPLETE block.
Gnothi transfers 24 bytes of metadata for each block during this phase. This
is 6GB per terabyte of data using 4KB blocks and 24MB per terabyte for 1MB
blocks, so the first phase typically takes a few seconds to a few minutes to complete.
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Note that during this metadata transfer, the other replicas continue to process new
reads and writes.
Phase 2: Re-replicate
In the second phase, the recovering replica retrieves from the others the data for
all the INCOMPLETE blocks in its preferred storage, thus freeing those replicas’
reserve storage. If a replica retains its data on its local disk, it just needs to fetch
the modified blocks. This case typically occurs when a replica crashes and recovers,
becomes temporarily disconnected from the network, or becomes temporarily slow.
If a replica loses its on-disk data as a result of a hardware fault, it needs to rebuild
its storage by fetching all blocks in its slices’ preferred storage.
This phase can take a long time, depending on how many blocks that need to
be fetched, but it is needed only to free the reserve space of other nodes so that they
are better equipped to mask future failures: once the replica recovers its metadata, it
can process all writes to its slices, and it can process reads to the subset of blocks that
are locally COMPLETE. Gnothi performs re-replication as a background task that
can be throttled to balance the resources used for re-replication and for processing
new client requests. Even if new client requests are processed at a high rate and
re-replication proceeds at a low rate, re-replication will still eventually complete
because the recovering replica’s metadata allows it to process new requests while it
is still catching up re-replicating missed old updates.
Every replica periodically checks its reserve storage: for every RESERVED
block, the reserved replica communicates with the block’s preferred replicas to check
whether the block is COMPLETE, and if a RESERVED block is COMPLETE on
all its preferred replicas, then the reserved replica can safely delete the block from
its reserve storage.
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2.2.5 Reducing replication state
Each replica needs to reserve space for f RESERVED slices. It is always safe to
set the size of reserve storage to be f times a slice size, so that it can absorb any
number of writes to each slice. This approach needs to pay a storage cost of 2f + 1
blocks for one block, since a data block is stored on a preferred quorum of f + 1
replicas, and the other f replicas must reserve space for this block in the reserve
storage: when f = 1, a replica must then allocate one third of its storage space for
reserve storage, and more when f is larger. This is the same space overhead of the
standard approach of Paxos or Gaios, which may be acceptable. When reducing
replication costs is a concern, however, Gnothi also enables allocating less space for
reserve storage. The risk of this thriftier approach is that if a failed replica does not
recover or is not replaced soon, the reserve storage can fill, preventing the system
from processing additional writes. However, filling the reserve storage does not put
safety at risk, since data is always written to f + 1 replicas. In general, Gnothi can
allocate less space for reserve storage in any of the following cases: 1) the workload is
read-heavy; 2) the workload is write-heavy but dominated by random writes so that
the throughput is low; 3) the workload is write-heavy but has good locality. Our
analysis of several disk traces suggests that, as long as the metadata is recovered
quickly, allocating 10% of disk space as reserve storage is enough to guarantee write
availability for many workloads.
Specifically, we analyze two sets of traces from Microsoft: one is collected by
Microsoft Research Cambridge [78] and it consists of 23 one-week disk traces under
different workloads; the other is collected on Microsoft’s production servers [58] and
consists of 44 disk traces, whose lengths vary from six hours to one day. We choose
these two sets of traces because they are recent and because they contain a variety
of workloads including compiling, MSN Storage, SQL Server, computation, etc. We
calculate the maximum usage ratio for each trace. To be precise, MaxUsage(T ) is
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the maximum number of different sectors written during any time interval of length
T , divided by the total number of sectors.
In the Microsoft Cambridge Traces, only two of the 23 traces write to more
than 10% of the disk space in a week. For the heaviest one, reserving 10% always
allows at least 10 minutes to finish Phase 1 and recover all metadata before the
system becomes unavailable to writes. A conservative administrator may reserve
more for this workload.
In the Microsoft Production Server Traces, 38 of the 44 disk traces write
to less than 10% of the space in their traces. For the heaviest one, reserving 10%
always allows at least 10 minutes to complete Phase 1.
2.2.6 Metadata
Each replica stores both local and replicated metadata for every block. The lo-
cal metadata consists of the COMPLETE bit for each block, and the replicated
metadata includes the version number and requestID for each block.
In Gnothi, caching in memory the COMPLETE bit of each block is feasible
in both size and cost. For example, with a small 4KB block each 1TB of disk
storage requires about 30MB of COMPLETE bits. In May 2012, a commodity
2TB internal hard drive costs about $120 and a common 4GB memory DIMM costs
about $25. This means that keeping COMPLETE bits in memory adds about 0.3%
to the dollar cost of the disk data it tracks. Gnothi regularly stores checkpoints of
the COMPLETE bits by writing the current state to local files.
The block number, version number, and requestID are 8 bytes each, and it
would be costly for Gnothi to keep them all in memory. Gnothi uses a metadata
storage design similar to that of BigTable [27,74]. Each Gnothi node maintains in a
local key-value store the mapping from logical block ID to version number and re-
questID. Metadata updates are logged to disk first as described before. Afterwards,
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to update a record, Gnothi first puts the record in a memory buffer; then when the
buffer is full, Gnothi sorts the buffer according to the key and then writes the whole
buffer to a new file. A background thread merges these files when there are too many
of them. Metadata writes and merges are fast, since they are sequential writes to
disk. Our micro benchmark shows that this approach can sustain a throughput of
about 200K writes per second, which is enough for our needs. Reading from meta-
data storage only occurs when Gnothi recovers a crashed or slow replica by fetching
metadata from another replica: this case requires a sequential scan of the metadata,
which is again fast. Individual read operations do not access metadata storage, since
a read operation only needs to access the COMPLETE bit.
2.3 Implementation
We implement Gnothi by modifying ZooKeeper’s source code. In particular: 1) we
reuse ZooKeeper’s network and agreement modules to replicate metadata; 2) we
add chain replication to forward data; 3) we modify the read protocol to provide
linearizable and scalable reads; 4) we replace ZooKeeper’s storage module with one
that supports preferred, reserve, and metadata storage; 5) we modify ZooKeeper’s
logging system to record PrepareData messages; 6) we implement recovery as de-
scribed in Section 2.2.4.
We apply several additional modifications to improve performance: first,
Gnothi modifies ZooKeeper’s agreement module to incorporate batching [26, 31],
which improves performance by about 10% for the sequential write workload. Sec-
ond, Gnothi reuses memory buffers to reduce memory allocation. ZooKeeper’s server
is implemented in Java, and our profiling shows that the overhead due to memory
allocation and garbage collection is quite substantial, especially if the block size
is large (ZooKeeper is explicitly not designed for large data blocks). To alleviate
this problem, we reuse allocated memory buffers, which is not hard since they all
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have the same size. This device improves read performance by about 10-15% in our
experiments.
2.4 Evaluation
2.4.1 Workload and Configuration
First, we evaluate the performance of Gnothi using micro benchmarks that issue
both sequential and random reads and writes. We compare Gnothi’s performance
to a Gaios-like system that we implement (denoted in the following as G’), and
to an unreplicated local disk. Both G’ and Gnothi use the same code base; the
only significant difference is that G’ forwards all updates and stores all blocks at all
replicas, while Gnothi processes each block at f + 1 of the 2f + 1 replicas.
Second, we evaluate Gnothi in failure and recovery. We compare Gnothi with
G’ and Cheap Paxos in terms of availability, performance in the face of failures, and
recovery time.
We use five machines as servers and five machines as clients. We run our
performance evaluation experiments for two configurations: f = 1 (three servers)
and f = 2 (five servers); we run the recovery experiments with f = 1. Gnothi’s
design calls for using a disk array for data storage and an additional disk to store log
and metadata, but since our machines have only two Western Digital WD2502ABYS
250GB 7200 RPM hard drives, we evaluate Gnothi in a configuration where one disk
is used as preferred and reserve storage, while the other stores the log and metadata.
Each machine is equipped with a 4-core Intel Xeon X3220 2.40GHz CPU and 3GB of
memory. For all experiments, we allocate 96GB of logical storage space replicated
across nodes by the system under test. All machines are connected with 1Gbps
ethernet.
For each experiment, we make sure there are enough client processes and
27
outstanding requests to saturate the system; we make sure the experiment is long
enough so that the write buffers are full; and we use the last 80% of requests to cal-
culate the stable throughput. In all experiments, the read and write batches at each
replica consist of, respectively, 100 and 10 requests. The values of other parameters
(number of clients, number of outstanding requests per client, etc) depend on the
block size (4K, 64K, 1M) and workloads (sequential/random write/read), and we
do not list all of them. In general, sequential workloads and small blocks need more
outstanding client requests to saturate the system; random workloads and big blocks
need fewer; and random workloads with small blocks need a longer time to saturate
the write buffer. For example, for the 4KB sequential write workloads, we use 30
clients, each with 200 outstanding requests, to saturate the system; for the 4KB
random write workloads, three clients with 200 requests each are enough, but we
need to run the experiments for three hours to measure the stable throughput; and
for the 1MB sequential write workloads, it takes just five clients with 60 outstanding
requests each to saturate the system.
2.4.2 I/O Throughput
Gnothi maximizes I/O throughput by executing reads and writes on subsets of disks.
Figure 2.4 shows the random I/O performance for f = 1 and f = 2. For
random workloads, the bottleneck of the system is the seek time for each replica’s
data disk.
For write operations, Gnothi is 40-64% faster than writing to local disk or
to G’ for f = 1 and 53-75% for f = 2. Gnothi’s advantage comes from only having
to perform the writes at 2/3 (for f = 1) or 3/5 (for f = 2) of the nodes. As
expected [19], the random write performance of G’ is close to that of a single local
disk because all replicas process all updates.
For read operations, Gnothi and G’ perform identically since they use the
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same read protocol. Gnothi/G’ is 2.5-3.4 times faster than a single local disk for
f = 1 and 3.3-6.1 times faster for f = 2, because it executes each read on one
replica. For small requests, the improvement factor can exceed 2f + 1 since each
replica is responsible for 1/(2f + 1) of the data, and thus the average seek time is
reduced.
Note that for small random I/O, the local per-disk write bandwidth signifi-
cantly exceeds the corresponding read bandwidth. The reason is that, once writes
are committed to the log, we can buffer large numbers of writes before writing them
back to the data disk, allowing the disk scheduler more opportunities to minimize
seek and rotational latency. Reads, on the other hand, must be processed immedi-
ately, so the scheduler has fewer opportunities for optimization. Taking for example
the 4KB random workload, a local disk can process 383 random writes per sec-
ond, while it can only process about 155 random reads per second if there are 100
concurrent read requests.
Figure 2.5 shows the effect of a burst of random writes when f = 1 and the
system buffers are not full. During the first few seconds, since writes are logged to the
logging disk, buffered in memory, but not bottlenecked by flushing to the data disk,
Gnothi’s throughput is much higher than that of the data disk write back. Then,
when the operating system detects that more than 10% of the system memory is
dirty, it begins to write back data to disk at the same rate it receives new requests,
and Gnothi slows down. Figure 2.4 shows the stable write throughput, where, to
eliminate the effects of the initial spike, we run our experiments for sufficiently long
(more than 3 hours) and calculate the throughput of the last 80% of requests.
Figure 2.6 shows the sequential I/O performance with f = 1 and f = 2.
For the sequential write workload with f = 1, Gnothi can achieve about
60MB/s with a 4KB block size and about 90MB/s with a 1MB block size. The bot-














































Figure 2.4: Random I/O with 3 (f=1) and 5 (f=2) servers.
about 15K updates per second. For 1MB requests, our profiler shows that the bot-
tleneck is probably Java’s memory allocation and garbage collection, so customized
memory management or a C implementation may achieve better performance. Com-
pared to G’, Gnothi is 44% to 56% faster because Gnothi directs writes to subsets
of nodes.
For the read workload, Gnothi/G’ can achieve a total bandwidth of about
250MB/s with 1MB blocks. One problem with reads is that if we use only 1 client,
the client network becomes a bottleneck, and if we use multiple clients, then the
workload is not fully sequential. This problem is more severe for small requests.

























Figure 2.5: Burst writes. In the default configuration, Linux starts to flush dirty
data to disk if 10% of total system memory pages are dirty.
writes increases by about 10% when f = 2. In the 4KB case the bottleneck is
agreement, so there is almost no improvement. G’s throughput slightly decreases
since its replication cost is higher. For reads, Gnothi/G’ scales throughput by nearly
a factor of 4 compared to a single disk.
2.4.3 Failure Recovery
Gnothi does three things to maximize availability and recovery speed. First, it fully
replicates metadata, allowing the system to remain continuosly available in the face









































Figure 2.6: Sequential I/O with 3 (f=1) and 5 (f=2) servers.
of data reduces recovery time, because the recovering node only needs to fetch
(f + 1)/(2f + 1) (e.g. 2/3 for f = 1) of the data. It also improves performance
during recovery, because once metadata is restored, full block updates are only sent
to and executed on the block’s preferred quorum. Third, separation of data and
metadata improves system throughput during recovery and reduces recovery time.
The recovering node can catch up with other nodes even if they continue to process
new updates at a high rate. In particular, since processing metadata is faster than
processing full requests, Phase 1 of recovery can always catch up with missed and
new requests. Once Phase 1 is complete, the recovering replica no longer falls behind
as new requests are executed, since it can process and store all new block updates
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directed to it, while it fetches old update bodies for all INCOMPLETE blocks in
its preferred slices.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 look at two recovery scenarios. Figure 2.7 shows the case
when a node temporarily fails and then recovers by fetching just the updated blocks
it missed. Figure 2.8 shows the case when a node permanently fails and is replaced
by a new node that must fetch all data from others. We run both experiments
with f = 1, 4KB blocks, and a sequential write workload. We choose the sequential
write workload because it is the most challenging workload for recovery, since during
recovery the clients are writing new contents at a high speed, which consumes a large
portion of the network and disk bandwidth from the servers.
In Figure 2.7, we kill one server 60 seconds after the experiment starts and
restart it 60 seconds later. Here both Gnothi and G’ suffer a brief drop in throughput
while they wait for timeout and then continue without the failed node. After the
replica restarts at time 120, it takes about 110 seconds (to time 230) to recover
from its local disk (mainly replaying logs), and about 22 seconds (to time 252)
to join the agreement protocol. Then Gnothi spends 26 seconds (to time 278)
in Phase 1, during which the recovering replica fetches write metadata (but not
data) and marks all updated blocks as INCOMPLETE. Once Phase 1 completes,
the recovering replica begins servicing new requests, writing new writes to its local
state, and marking updated blocks as COMPLETE. After Phase 1 completes, the
recovering replica also begins Phase 2 of recovery by fetching from other replicas
INCOMPLETE blocks in its preferred slices. Phase 2 completes at time 530, at
which point recovery is complete, and Gnothi returns to its original throughput.
G’s throughput starts at 50MB/s and remains the same while the failure
occurs. After the replica resumes operation, in order to complete the recovery at






































Figure 2.7: Failure recovery (catch up).
Cheap Paxos is unavailable from time 30 to 230, since there is only one
available replica and since it does not have sufficient time to copy 96GB to a spare
machine. When the replica resumes operation, Cheap Paxos can immediately go
back to normal (time 230) since it does not process any new requests during the
failure period.
In Figure 2.8, one server is killed 300 seconds after the experiment is started
and is replaced 300 seconds later by a new server whose local disk is initialized
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and needs to be fully rebuilt. Gnothi takes about 80 seconds2 in Phase 1 to fetch
metadata from the primary. After Phase 1 completes, the recovering replica begins
servicing new requests, and at the same time, re-replicating its disk by fetching
blocks from others. The recovering replica completes re-replication at time 3400,
and during this period, it can service new requests at a rate of about 48 MB/s.
G’ can also complete recovery at time 3400, but during this period, it can
only service new requests at a rate of about 16 MB/s.
Cheap Paxos is unavailable before re-replication completes, but since it uses
all its bandwidth to perform recovery, it ends re-replication at time 2400.
Comparing Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8, Gnothi’s catch-up recovery takes less
time than full re-replication (410 seconds vs 2800 seconds), but catch-up inflicts a
bigger hit on throughput because when re-replicating all blocks, the disk accesses are
always sequential, and when re-replicating a subset of them, the disk accesses may
be random. This means the recovery cost per block is smaller in full re-replication,
though the total number of blocks to be fetched is larger, and this results in higher
client throughput but longer recovery time.
Both Gnothi and G’ can divide resources between servicing new requests and
fetching state for recovery by tuning the time interval (in milliseconds) for a replica
to issue a 16 MB state fetch request: a smaller number means more aggressive
recovery. In Figures 2.7 and 2.8, we configure this parameter so that Gnothi and
G’ can recover in similar time, while still providing reasonable throughput for new
requests. In Figures 2.9 and 2.10, we show the effect of different configurations.
Figure 2.9 shows that Gnothi can always catch up, so the administrator
2This may seem like a long time considering that the size of metadata is about 576MB. This
figure is due to three reasons: first, the metadata storage uses a design based on Bigtable (see
Section 2.2.6), which logs metadata first and garbage-collects outdated log entries periodically in
the background: in such a design, the actual size of metadata to be scanned is usually larger than
576MB, because certain outdated metadata may not have been garbage-collected yet. Second,
although ideally, disk scan and network transfer of metadata should be parallelized to maximize
throughput, we have not implemented this optimization. Third, clients may still send requests to





































Figure 2.8: Failure recovery (re-replicate).
can tune this parameter to balance resources used for recovery and for processing
new requests. Conversely, if G’ sets this parameter too high (not aggressive), the
recovering replica never catches up. For example, in Figure 2.10, the replica in the
experiment with parameter 600 does not catch up, since the recovery speed is similar
to the speed of processing new requests. Gnothi is almost always better than G’ in
our experiments: if recovery times are similar, Gnothi can provide better throughput


























Figure 2.9: Gnothi with different recovery values.
2.5 Conclusion
Gnothi is an asynchronous replicated storage system with low replication cost and
fast failure recovery. Gnothi accomplishes this by separating data and metadata
and replicating metadata on all replicas, while replicating data on subsets of them.
Gnothi demonstrates that full replication of metadata can 1) ensure that the
system works correctly despite partial replication of data and 2) speed up recovery
when replicas fail. The evaluation shows that Gnothi achieves higher throughput



























Figure 2.10: G’ with different recovery values.
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Chapter 3
Salus: Robust and Scalable
Storage
Many distributed storage systems experience the tension between robustness and
scalability, because stronger protection techniques are usually more expensive and
thus are rarely deployed at large scale.
This chapter describes the design and implementation of Salus,1 a scalable
block store in the spirit of Amazon’s Elastic Block Store (EBS) [7]: a user can
request storage space from the service provider, mount it like a local disk, and run
applications upon it, while the service provider replicates data for durability and
availability.
What makes Salus unique is its dual focus on scalability and robustness. Some
recent systems have provided end-to-end correctness guarantees on distributed stor-
age despite arbitrary node failures [26, 31, 73], but these systems are not scalable—
they require each correct node to process at least a majority of updates. Conversely,
scalable distributed storage systems [9,10,12,23,27,44,66,72,100] typically protect
some subsystems like disk storage with redundant data and checksums, but fail to
1Salus is the Roman goddess of safety and welfare.
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protect the entire path from client put to client get, leaving them vulnerable to
single points of failure that can cause data corruption or loss.
Salus provides strong end-to-end correctness guarantees for read operations,
strict ordering guarantees for write operations, and strong durability and availability
guarantees despite a wide range of server failures (including memory corruptions,
disk corruptions, firmware bugs, etc). To scale these guarantees to thousands of
machines and tens of thousands of disks, Salus leverages an architecture similar
to scalable key-value stores like Bigtable [27] and HBase [12], but achieving this
unprecedented combination of robustness and scalability presents several challenges.
First, to build a high-performance block store from low-performance disks,
Salus must be able to write different sets of updates to multiple disks in parallel.
Parallelism, however, can threaten the basic consistency requirement of a block
store, as “later” writes may survive a crash, while “earlier” ones are lost.
Second, aiming for efficiency and high availability at low cost can have un-
intended consequences on robustness by introducing single points of failure. For
example, in order to maximize throughput and availability for reads while mini-
mizing latency and cost, scalable storage systems execute read requests at just one
replica. If that replica experiences a commission failure that causes it to generate
erroneous state or output, the data returned to the client could be incorrect. Simi-
larly, to reduce cost and for ease of design, many systems that replicate their storage
layer for fault tolerance (such as HBase) leave unreplicated the computation nodes
that can modify the state of that layer: hence, a memory error or an errant put
at a single HBase region server can irrevocably and undetectably corrupt data (see
Section 3.4.1).
Third, additional robustness should ideally not result in higher replication
cost. For example, in a perfect world Salus’ ability to tolerate commission failures
would not require any more data replication than a scalable key-value store such as
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HBase already employs to ensure durability despite omission failures.
To address these challenges Salus introduces three novel ideas—pipelined
commit, active storage, and scalable end-to-end verification—based on the principle
of separating data from metadata.
Pipelined commit. By tracking the necessary dependency metadata, Salus’
new pipelined commit protocol allows writes to be processed in parallel at multi-
ple disks but guarantees that, despite failures, the system will be left in a state
consistent with the ordering of writes specified by the client.
Active storage. To prevent a single node from corrupting data or metadata,
Salus replicates both the storage and the computation layer. To reduce the cost of
storage replication, Salus incorporates the idea of Gnothi, requiring only f + 1 data
replicas to tolerate f failures. To reduce the cost of replicating computation, Salus
applies an update to the system’s persistent state only if the update is agreed upon
by all of the replicated computation nodes. This approach, again, requires only
f +1 replicas to tolerate f failures. We make two observations about active storage.
First, perhaps surprisingly, replicating the computation nodes can actually improve
system performance by moving the computation near the data (rather than vice
versa), a good choice when network bandwidth is a more limited resource than CPU
cycles. Second, by requiring the unanimous consent of all replicas before an update
is applied, Salus comes near to its perfect world with respect to overhead: Salus
remains safe (i.e. keeps its blocks consistent and durable) despite two commission
failures with just three-way replication—the same degree of data replication needed
by HBase to tolerate two permanent omission failures. The flip side, of course, is
that insisting on unanimous consent can reduce the times during which Salus is live
(i.e. its blocks are available)—but liveness is easily restored by replacing the faulty
set of computation nodes with a new set that can use the storage layer to recover
the state required to resume processing requests.
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Scalable end-to-end verification. Salus maintains sufficient metadata—a
Merkle tree [18, 75]—for each volume so that a client can validate that each get
request returns consistent and correct data: if not, the client can reissue the request
to another replica. Reads can then safely proceed at a single replica without leaving
clients vulnerable to reading corrupted data; more generally, such end-to-end as-
surances protect Salus clients from the opportunities for error and corruption that
can arise in complex, black-box cloud storage solutions. Further, Salus’ Merkle tree,
unlike those used in other systems that support end-to-end verification [3,43,69,73],
is scalable: each server only needs to keep the sub-tree corresponding to its own
data, and the client can rebuild and check the integrity of the whole tree even after
failing and restarting from an empty state.
We have prototyped Salus by modifying the HBase key-value store. The
evaluation confirms that Salus can tolerate servers experiencing commission fail-
ures like memory corruption, disk corruption, etc. Although one might fear the
performance price to be paid for Salus’ robustness, Salus’ overheads are low in all
of our experiments. In fact, despite its strong guarantees, Salus often outperforms
HBase, especially when disk bandwidth is plentiful compared to network bandwidth.
For example, Salus’ active replication allows it to halve network bandwidth while
increasing aggregate write throughput by a factor of 1.74 in a well-provisioned sys-
tem.
3.1 Requirements and model
Salus provides the abstraction of a large collection of virtual disks, each of which is
an array of fixed-sized blocks. Each virtual disk is a volume that can be mounted
by a client running in the datacenter that hosts the volume. The volume’s size (e.g.,
several hundred GB to several hundred TB) and block size (e.g., 4 KB to 256 KB)
are specified at creation time.
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A volume’s interface supports get and put, which on a disk correspond to
read and write. A client may have many such commands outstanding to maximize
throughput. At any given time, only one client may mount a volume for writing,
and during that time no other client can mount the volume for reading. Different
clients may mount and write different volumes at the same time, and multiple clients
may simultaneously mount a read-only snapshot of a volume.
We explicitly designed Salus to support only a single writer per volume for
two reasons. First, as demonstrated by the success of Amazon EBS, this model is
sufficient to support disk-like storage. Second, we are not aware of a design that
would allow Salus to support multiple writers while achieving its other goals: strong
consistency,2 scalability, and end-to-end verification for read requests.
Even though each volume has only a single writer at a time, a distributed
block store has several advantages over a local one. Spreading a volume across
multiple machines not only allows disk throughput and storage capacity to exceed
the capabilities of a single machine, but balances load and increases resource uti-
lization. Further, storing data on multiple servers opens up the opportunities to
improve availability and durability: if a server fails, the client can access another
server holding a copy of the data; if the client fails, the user can quickly start a new
client by recovering data from the servers.
To minimize cost, a typical server in existing storage deployments is relatively
storage heavy, with a total capacity of up to 24TB [11, 99]. We expect a storage
server in a Salus deployment to have ten or more SATA disks and two 1Gbit/s
network connections. In this configuration disk bandwidth is several times more
plentiful than network bandwidth, so the Salus design seeks to minimize network
bandwidth consumption.




Salus is designed to operate on an unreliable network with unreliable nodes. The
network can drop, reorder, modify, or arbitrarily delay messages.
For storage nodes, we assume that 1) servers can crash and recover, tem-
porarily making their disks’ data unavailable (transient omission failure); 2) servers
and disks can fail, permanently losing all their data (permanent omission failure); 3)
disks and the software that controls them can cause corruption, where some blocks
are lost or modified, possibly silently [87] and servers can experience memory cor-
ruption, software bugs, etc, sending corrupted messages to other nodes (commission
failure). When calculating failure thresholds, we only take into account commission
failures and permanent omission failures. Transient omission failures are not treated
as failures: in asynchronous systems a node that fails and recovers is indistinguish-
able from a slow node.
In line with Salus’ aim to provide end-to-end robustness guarantees, we do
not try to explicitly enumerate and patch all the different ways in which servers
can fail. Instead, we design Salus to tolerate arbitrary failures, both of omission,
where a faulty node fails to perform actions specified by the protocol, such as send-
ing, receiving, or processing a message; and of commission [31], where a faulty
node performs arbitrary actions not called for by the protocol. However, while we
assume that faulty nodes will potentially generate arbitrarily erroneous state and
output, given the data center environment we target we explicitly do not attempt
to tolerate cases where a malicious adversary controls some of the servers. Hence,
we replace the traditional BFT assumption that faulty nodes cannot break crypto-
graphic primitives [89] with the stronger (but fundamentally similar) assumption
that a faulty node never produces a checksum that appears to be a correct checksum
produced by a different node. In practice, this means that where in a traditional
Byzantine-tolerant system [25] we might have used signatures or arrays of message
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authentication codes (MACs) with pairwise secret keys, we instead weakly sign com-
munication using checksums salted with the checksum creator’s well-known ID.
Salus relies on weak synchrony assumptions for both safety and liveness. For
safety, Salus assumes that clocks are sufficiently synchronized that a ZooKeeper
lease is never considered valid by a client when the server considers it invalid. Salus
only guarantees liveness during synchronous intervals where messages sent between
correct nodes are received and processed within some timeout [22].
3.1.2 Consistency model
To be usable as a virtual disk, Salus must ensure the standard disk semantics pro-
vided by physical disks. These semantics allow some requests to be marked as
barriers. A disk must guarantee that all requests received before a barrier are com-
mitted before the barrier, and all requests received after the barrier are committed
after the barrier. Additionally, a disk guarantees freshness: a read to a block returns
the latest committed write to that block.
Salus implements a stronger guarantee: When there are no more than f (we
use f = 2 in Salus) failures, Salus guarantees both freshness and a property we call
ordered-commit: if a write request R commits, then all write requests that were sent
by the client before R are guaranteed to eventually commit. Note that ordered-
commit eliminates the need for explicit barriers since every write request functions
as a barrier. Although we did not set out to achieve ordered-commit and its stronger
guarantees, Salus provides them without any noticeable effect on performance.
Salus mainly focuses on tolerating arbitrary failures (in the sense specified
in Section 3.1.1) of server-side storage systems, since they entail most of the com-
plexity and are primarily responsible for preserving the durability and availability
of data. Client commission failures can also be handled using replication, but this
falls beyond the scope of this work.
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3.2 Background
Salus’ starting point is the scalable architecture of HBase/HDFS, which Salus care-
fully modifies to boost robustness without introducing new bottlenecks. We chose
the HBase/HDFS architecture for three main reasons: first, it provides a key-value
interface that can be easily modified to support a block store; second, it has a large
user base that includes companies such as Yahoo!, Facebook, and Twitter; and
third, unlike other successful large-scale storage systems with similar architectural
features, such as Windows Azure Storage [23] and Google’s Bigtable/GFS [27, 44],
HBase/HDFS is open source.
HDFS HDFS [95] is an append-only distributed file system whose design is based
on Google’s File System [44]. It stores the system’s namespace and membership
information in a NameNode and replicates the data over a set of DataNodes. Each
file consists of a set of blocks, and HDFS ensures that each block is replicated across a
specified number of DataNodes (three by default) despite DataNode failures. HDFS
is widely used, primarily because of its scalability.
HBase HBase [12] is a distributed key-value store whose design is based on Google’s
Bigtable [27]. It exports the abstraction of tables accessible through a put/get in-
terface. Each table is split into multiple regions of non-overlapping key-ranges (for
load balancing). Each region is assigned to one region server that is responsible for
all requests to that region. Region servers use HDFS as a storage layer to ensure
that data is replicated persistently across enough nodes. Additionally, HBase uses
a Master node to manage the assignment of key-ranges to various region servers.
Region servers receive clients’ put and get requests and transform them
into equivalent requests that are appropriate for the append-only interface exposed
by HDFS. On receiving a put, a region server logs the request to a write-ahead-log
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stored on HDFS and updates its sorted, in-memory map (called memstore) with the
new put. When the size of the memstore exceeds a predefined threshold, the region
server flushes the memstore to a checkpoint file stored on HDFS.
On receiving a get request for a key, the region server looks up the key in its
memstore. If a match is found, the region server returns the corresponding value;
otherwise, it looks up the key in various checkpoints, starting from the most recent
one, and returns the first matching value. Periodically, to minimize the storage
overheads and the get latency, the region server performs compaction by reading a
number of contiguous checkpoints and merging them into a single checkpoint.
ZooKeeper ZooKeeper [54] is a replicated coordination service. It is used by
HBase to ensure that each key-range is assigned to at most one region server.
3.3 The design of Salus
The architecture of Salus, as Figure 3.1 shows, bears considerable resemblance to
that of HBase. Like HBase, Salus uses HDFS as its reliable and scalable storage
layer, partitions key ranges within a table in distinct regions for load balancing, and
supports the abstraction of a region server responsible for handling requests for the
keys within a region. As in HBase, blocks are mapped to their region server through
a Master node, leases are managed using ZooKeeper, and Salus clients need to in-
stall a block driver to access the storage system, not unlike the client library used for
the same purpose in HBase. These similarities are intentional: they aim to retain in
Salus the ability to scale to thousands of nodes and tens of thousands of disks that
has secured HBase’s success. Indeed, one of the main challenges in designing Salus
was to achieve its robustness goals (strict ordering guarantees for write operations
across multiple disks, end-to-end correctness guarantees for read operations, strong


























Figure 3.1: The architecture of Salus. Salus differs from HBase in three key ways.
First, Salus’ block driver performs end-to-end checks to validate each get reply.
Second, Salus performs pipelined commit across different key regions to ensure or-
dered commit. Third, Salus replicates region servers via active storage to eliminate
spurious state updates. For efficiency, Salus tries to co-locate the replicated region
servers with the replicated DataNodes (DNs).
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the scalability of the original HBase design. With this in mind, we have designed
Salus so that, whenever possible, it buttresses architectural features it inherits from
HBase—and does so scalably. So, the core of Salus’ active storage is a three-way
replicated region server (RRS), which upgrades the original HBase region server
abstraction to guarantee safety despite up to two arbitrary server failures. Simi-
larly, Salus’ end-to-end verification is performed within the familiar architectural
feature of the block driver, though upgraded to support Salus’ scalable verification
mechanisms.
Figure 3.1 also helps describe the role played by our novel techniques (pipelined
commit, scalable end-to-end verification, and active storage) in the operation of
Salus.
Every client request in Salus is mediated by the block driver, which exports
a virtual disk interface by converting the application’s API calls into Salus get and
put requests. The block driver, as we saw, is the component in charge of perform-
ing Salus’ scalable end-to-end verification (see Section 3.3.3): for put requests it
generates the appropriate metadata, while for get requests it uses the request’s
metadata to check whether the data returned to the client is consistent.
To issue a request, the client (or rather, its block driver) contacts the Master,
which identifies the RRS responsible for servicing the block that the client wants to
access. The client caches this information for future use and forwards the request to
that RRS. The first responsibility of the RRS is to ensure that the request commits
in the order specified by the client. This is where the pipelined commit protocol
becomes important: as we will see in more detail in Section 3.3.1, the protocol
requires only minimal coordination to enforce dependencies among requests assigned
to distinct RRSs. If the request is a put, the RRS also needs to ensure that the data
associated with the request is made persistent, despite the possibility of individual
region servers suffering commission failures. This is the role of active storage (see
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Section 3.3.2): the responsibility of processing put requests is no longer assigned
to a single region server, but is instead conditioned on the set of region servers in
the RRS achieving unanimous consent on the update to be performed. Thanks to
Salus’ end-to-end verification guarantees, get requests can instead be safely carried
out by a single region server (with obvious performance benefits), without running
the risk that the client sees incorrect or stale data.
3.3.1 Pipelined commit
The goal of the pipelined commit protocol is to allow clients to issue requests to
multiple regions concurrently, while preserving the ordering specified by the client
(ordered-commit). In the presence of even simple crash failures, however, enforcing
the ordered-commit property can be challenging.
Consider, for example, a client that, after mounting a volume V that spans
regions 1 and 2, issues a put u1 for a block mapped to region 1 and then, without
waiting for the put to complete, issues a barrier put u2 for a block mapped to region
2. Untimely crashes of the client and of the region server for region 1 may lead to
u1 being lost even as u2 commits.
3 Volume V would now violate the standard disk
semantics; further, V would be left in an invalid state that can potentially cause
severe data loss [28,87].
A simple way to avoid such inconsistencies would be to allow clients to issue
one request (or one batch of requests) at a time, but, as we show in Section 3.4.2,
performance would suffer significantly. Instead, we would like to achieve the good
performance that comes with issuing multiple outstanding requests, without com-
promising the ordered-commit property.
The basic insight of Salus’ solution is that processing data out of order, as a
result of parallel processing and failures, is fine as long as the clients can only observe
3For simplicity, in this example and throughout this section we consider a single logical region
server to be at work in each region. In practice, in Salus this abstraction is implemented by a RRS.
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the data in the correct order, even if such out-of-order data is made persistent
on disks: such prematurely-persisted data can be garbage-collected without being
noticed by clients. To ensure clients can only observe data in the correct order, we
once again apply the idea of separating data from metadata: Salus parallelizes the
bulk of the processing (such as cryptographic checks and disk-writes) required to
handle each request, while ensuring that requests commit in order by transferring a
small quantity of metadata sequentially.
Salus ensures ordered-commit by exploiting the sequence number that clients
assign to each request. Region servers use these sequence numbers to guarantee that
a request does not commit (become visible to clients) unless all the previous requests
are persistent on disks, and thus are guaranteed to eventually commit. Similarly,
during recovery, these sequence numbers are used to ensure that a consistent prefix
of issued requests are recovered (Section 3.3.4).
Salus’ approach to ensure ordered-commit for gets is simple. Like other
systems before it [19], Salus neither assigns new sequence numbers to gets, nor logs
gets to stable storage. Instead, to prevent returning stale values, a get request
to a region server simply carries a prevNum field indicating the sequence number
of the last put executed on that region: region servers do not execute a get until
they have committed a put with the prevNum sequence number. Conversely, to
prevent the value of a block from being overwritten by a later put, clients block
put requests to a block that has outstanding get requests.4
Salus’ pipelined commit protocol for puts is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The
client, as in HBase, issues requests in batches. Unlike HBase, Salus allows each client
to issue multiple outstanding batches. Each batch is committed using a protocol





















Figure 3.2: Pipelined commit (each batch leader is actually replicated to tolerate
arbitrary faults.)
consisting of the phases described below.5
PC1. Choosing the batch leader and participants. To process a batch, a client divides
its puts into various sub-batches, one per region server. Just like a get
request, a put request to a region also includes a prevNum field to identify the
last put request issued to that region. The client identifies one region server as
batch leader for the batch and sends each sub-batch to the appropriate region
server along with the batch leader’s identity. The client sends the sequence
numbers of all requests in the batch to the batch leader, along with the identity
of the leader of the previous batch.
PC2. Preparing. A region server preprocesses the puts in its sub-batch by validating
each request, i.e. by checking whether the request is signed and by using the
prevNum field to verify it is the next request that the region server should
process. If validation succeeds for all requests in the sub-batch, the region
server logs the requests (which are now prepared) and sends its yes vote to
5This protocol looks similar to a two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [45, 65], but it is designed
for a different purpose: the objective of 2PC is to ensure that a batch or transaction is either fully
executed or not, while that of pipelined commit is to ensure that if a batch is committed, all batches
that preceded it will eventually be committed.
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the batch’s leader; otherwise, the region server votes no.
PC3. Deciding. The batch leader can decide commit only if it receives a yes vote
for all the puts in its batch and a commit-confirmation from the leader
of the previous batch; otherwise, it decides abort. Either way, the leader
notifies the participants of its decision. Upon receiving commit for a request,
a region server updates its memory state (memstore), sends a put success
notification to the client, and asynchronously marks the request as committed
on persistent storage. On receiving abort, a region server discards the state
associated with that put and sends the client a put failure message. Abort
can happen when the client is faulty (e.g. corrupted memory), the network is
faulty (e.g. corrupted messages), or a logical region server is faulty. As shown
in the next section, each logical region server is actually a replicated group and
Salus can mask up to two failures inside a group. If more than two failures
occur as a result of a severe problem (e.g. configuration error, bugs in the code,
etc), then the logical region server may behave unexpectedly and the batch
leader may decide to abort. When a client receives the put failure message
as the result of an aborted request, it retries the corresponding request for
a certain number of times to see whether the problem is transient (e.g. an
occasional bit blip in the network), and if not, the client must notify the
administrator for further assistance.
Notice that all disk writes—both within a batch and across batches—can pro-
ceed in parallel and that the voting and commit phases for a given batch can be simi-
larly parallelized. Different region servers receive and log the put and commit asyn-
chronously. The only serialization point is the passing of commit-confirmation
from the leader of a batch to the leader of the next batch.
Despite its parallelism, the protocol ensures that requests commit in the
order specified by the client. The presence of commit in any correct region server’s
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log implies that all preceding puts in this batch must have prepared. Furthermore,
all requests in preceding batches must have also prepared. Our recovery protocol
(Section 3.3.4) ensures that all prepared puts eventually commit without violating
ordered-commit.
The pipelined commit protocol enforces ordered-commit assuming the ab-
straction of (logical) region servers that are correct. It is the active storage protocol
(Section 3.3.2) that, from physical region servers that can lose committed data and
suffer arbitrary failures, provides this abstraction to the pipelined commit protocol.
3.3.2 Active storage
Active storage provides the abstraction of a region server that does not experience
arbitrary failures or lose data. Salus uses active storage to ensure that the data
remains available and durable despite arbitrary failures in the storage system by ad-
dressing two key limitations of existing scalable storage systems: first, they replicate
data at the storage layer (e.g. HDFS) but leave the computation layer (e.g. HBase)
unreplicated. As a result, the computation layer that processes clients’ requests rep-
resents a single point of failure in an otherwise robust system. For example, a bug
in computing the checksum of data or a corruption of the memory of a region server
can lead to data loss and data unavailability in systems like HBase. Second, the
storage layer usually replicates data with three-way synchronous primary-backup
protocols, requiring minimal cost but leaving the system vulnerable to uncommon
errors.
To prevent a region server from being a single point of failure, the design of
Salus uses a new active storage architecture that embodies a simple principle: all
changes to persistent state should happen with the consent of a quorum of nodes.
Salus uses these compute quorums to protect its data from faults in its region servers:
when a compute quorum sends data to the storage layer, all nodes in the quorum
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must unanimously agree on a certificate, which carries information to validate data,
and send the certificate to the storage layer so that the storage nodes can verify
data integrity.
To tolerate arbitrary failures in the storage layer, the active storage archi-
tecture incorporates the central idea of Gnothi: to tolerate two failures, it replicates
data on just three nodes, but replicates metadata (certificate) on five nodes. By
using separate policies when replicating data and metadata, Salus can identify the
correct version of data despite arbitrary failures with minimal replication costs.
Using active storage, Salus can provide strong availability and durability
guarantees: a data block will remain available and durable as long as there are no
more than two failures occurring on the physical machines that are processing the
block.6 These guarantees hold irrespective of whether the nodes fail by crashing
(omission) or by corrupting their disk, memory, or logical state (commission).
Replication typically incurs network and storage overheads. Salus uses three
key ideas—(1) moving computation to data, (2) using unanimous consent quorums,
and (3) separating data from metadata—to ensure that active storage does not incur
significant network or storage overhead compared to existing approaches. Perhaps
surprisingly, in addition to improving fault-resilience, active storage improves per-
formance, by trading relatively cheap CPU cycles for expensive network bandwidth.
Moving computation to data to minimize network usage
Salus implements active storage by blurring the boundaries between the storage
layer and the computation layer. Existing storage systems [12, 23, 27] require a
designated primary DataNode to mediate updates. In contrast, Salus modifies the
storage system API to permit region servers to directly update any replica of a
6 A data block is processed by three region servers, three DataNodes, and two witness nodes.
Salus allows a region server to be colocated with a DataNode or a witness node on the same physical
machine. Salus can tolerate two physical machine failures, which means that two pairs of colocated
processes can be faulty, but at least one region server/DataNode pair is correct.
55
block. Using this modified interface, Salus can efficiently implement active storage
by colocating a computation node (region server) with the storage node (DataNode)
that it needs to access.
Active storage thus reduces bandwidth utilization in exchange for additional
CPU usage (Section 3.4.2)—an attractive trade-off for bandwidth constrained data-
centers. In particular, because a region server can now update the colocated DataN-
ode without requiring the network, the bandwidth overheads of flushing (Section 3.2)
and compaction (Section 3.2) in HBase are avoided.
We have implemented active storage in HBase by changing the NameNode
API for allocating blocks. As in HBase, to create a block a region server sends a
request to the NameNode, which responds with the new block’s location; but where
the HBase NameNode makes its placement decisions in splendid solitude, in Salus
the request to the NameNode includes a list of preferred DataNodes as a location-
hint. The hint biases the NameNode toward assigning the new block to DataNodes
hosted on the same machines that also host the region servers that will access the
block. The NameNode follows the hint unless doing so violates its load-balancing
policies.
Loosely coupling in this way the region servers and DataNodes of a block
yields Salus significant network bandwidth savings (Section 3.4.2). Why then not
go all the way—eliminate the HDFS layer and have each region server store its state
on its local file system? The reason is that maintaining flexibility in block placement
is crucial to the robustness of Salus: our design allows the NameNode to continue
to load balance and re-replicate blocks as needed, and makes it easy for a recovering
region server to read state from any DataNode that stores it, not just its own disk.
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Using unanimous consent to reduce replication overheads
To prevent a failed region server from propagating errors to DataNodes, Salus asks
the RRS to agree on the puts to be stored. BFT agreement, the traditional solu-
tion to this problem, requires 3f + 1 replicas and thus is usually perceived as too
expensive in practice. Salus reduces this threshold to its minimal value of f + 1 by
leveraging two observations. First, one key challenge in BFT agreement—a faulty
leader proposes different execution orders to different participating servers—does
not exist in Salus, because (1) Salus relies on the single client allowed to perform
writes on a given volume to specify the order in which puts should execute7 and
(2) each region server can validate a client’s requests independently. This allows
Salus to reduce by f the number of replicas it needs to guarantee safety [30]. Sec-
ond, region servers do not have any persistent state: their state is stored on the
DataNodes. Therefore, a region server failed on one machine can be recovered on
another machine by reading data from the relevant DataNodes. This allows Salus
to further reduce its replication cost by f in the failure free case, down to f + 1
by sending requests to only a minimal preferred quorum [33] and failing over to a
different quorum if the preferred quorum fails to make progress.
Taking advantage of these two observations, Salus uses unanimous-consent
quorums for puts: the replicated region servers check clients’ requests indepen-
dently, reach unanimous consent for any operation that updates the state, and
generate a certificate proving the legitimacy of the update.
This approach provides safety guarantee despite two commission failures be-
cause an update must be agreed by three region servers, each of whom can validate
requests independently. However, the failure of any of the replicated region servers
can prevent unanimous consent. To ensure liveness, Salus replaces any RRS that is
not making adequate progress with a new set of region servers, which read all state
7 Of course the client can also be faulty, but no guarantee can be achieved for the user anyway
if an unreplicated client is faulty.
57
committed by the previous region server quorum from the DataNodes and resume
processing requests. This fail-over protocol is a slight variation of the one already
present in HBase to handle failures of unreplicated region servers. If a client detects
a problem with a RRS, it sends a RRS-replacement request to the Master, which
first attempts to get all the nodes of the existing RRS to relinquish their leases; if
that fails, the Master coordinates with ZooKeeper to prevent lease renewal. Once
the previous RRS is known to be disabled, the Master appoints a new RRS. Then
Salus performs the recovery protocol as described in Section 3.3.4.
Separating data from metadata to reduce storage overheads
Three DataNodes are not enough to tolerate two commission failures in an asyn-
chronous environment—during failure recovery, if two nodes are not responding in
time and the remaining available node provides a valid version of the data, it’s im-
possible for the system to decide the correct way to proceed. On the one hand,
the valid data may be a stale version provided by a faulty node, so accepting it
may cause the system to lose a suffix of data. On the other hand, waiting for other
nodes to respond is unacceptable, since those nodes may have failed permanently.
Indeed, it has been proved that we need at least five execution replicas to tolerate
two commission failures in an asynchronous environment [109].
The lesson we learned from Gnothi, however, is that it is not necessary for all
these five replicas to store all data: in Salus, only three DataNodes store data and
certificates while the remaining two serve as witnesses, storing only the certificates.
As in Gnothi, during recovery (see Section 3.3.4), the fully replicated certificates
help the system identify the correct data.
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Active storage protocol
To provide the other components of Salus with the abstraction of a correct region
server, region servers within a RRS are organized in a chain. In response to a
client’s put request or to attend a periodic task (such as flushing and compaction),
the primary region server (the first replica in the chain) forwards the request (the
put request or a special flush or compact request) to all region servers in the chain.
After executing the request, the region servers in the RRS coordinate to create a
certificate attesting that all replicas executed the request in the same order and
obtained identical responses. The components of Salus (such as client, NameNode,
and Master) that use active storage to make data persistent require all messages
from a RRS to carry such a certificate: this guarantees no spurious changes to
persistent data as long as at least one region server and its corresponding DataNode
do not experience a commission failure.
Figure 3.3 shows how active storage refines the pipelined commit protocol
for put requests.
• Step ©1 . The put issued by a client is received by the primary region server
as part of a sub-batch. The primary region server needs to ensure the safety
property that the system processes correct requests in the correct order. To
make this possible, the put request carries additional metadata including the
client ID, the checksum of the data, the sequence number and the prevNum
assigned by the client (see Section 3.3.1), and finally the client’s signature of
all information. Upon receiving a put, the primary region server validates
it independently by checking 1) the signature matches the client ID; 2) the
checksum matches the data; and 3) the prevNum is the same as the sequence
number of the previous put received by this region. If the validation succeeds,
the region server forwards it down the chain of replicas and each replica will
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Figure 3.3: Steps to process a put request in Salus using active storage. W1 and
W2 are witness nodes. Note that steps 1 to 4 are executed in the same group of
nodes, but for clarity, we separate these steps in two figures.
for a region server to accept a corrupted put or miss a put from the client,
as long as the client does not experience commission failures.
• Step ©2 . Each region server writes the put requests to the corresponding
DataNode of its log file, assigned by the NameNode, and waits for the DataN-
ode to confirm that data is persistent. Note that at this point, no unanimous
consent is reached yet and the DataNode cannot validate the correctness of
data, except that data is from the expected region server; the DataNode just
logs the data optimistically, hoping that unanimous consent will be reached
later. And if not, the data will be garbage-collected in the recovery protocol
(see Section 3.3.4). One may wonder why the DataNode cannot verify the
data directly by using the mechanism described in step ©1 . This is because
a DataNode, as a component HDFS, is designed to process append-only logs,
and it does not understand the semantics of the put/get interface of HBase;
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it is the task of the region server to convert a put request into an append
operation on a DataNode: during this procedure, a region server may split
its log into multiple files and HDFS may also split a file into multiple blocks.
In addition, both the HBase layer and the HDFS layer are adding additional
information to the log, such as timestamp. As a result, what is received by a
DataNode is a mixture of clients’ puts, possibly broken into pieces, and the
additional information from HBase and HDFS. In this case, it is impossible
for the DataNode to verify puts directly.
• Step ©3 . For the data it just writes, each region server generates a tenta-
tive log entry certificate, which contains the file ID (assigned by NameN-
ode) of the log, the starting position of the data in the file, the length of the
data, the checksum of the data, and a signature. The certificate not only val-
idates data content, but also validates data location, which is critical because
the order of puts in log files can affect recovery. Each region server then
broadcasts its tentative log entry certificate to three DataNodes and two
witness nodes. If a DataNode or witness node receives three correctly signed
and matching tentative log entry certificates, it combines them into a
log entry certificate and stores it. Note that at this time a DataNode does
not even need to verify data with the log entry certificate: such verification
can be delayed until recovery. A log entry certificate serves two purposes:
first, it proves the correctness of the data, since it has been agreed by three
region servers, of which one is correct. Such proof allows Salus to validate
data during recovery. Second, it also implicitly serves as a proof that the
data is already stored on at least one correct DataNode, because at least a
region server and DataNode pair is correct, and the correct region server only
proposes its tentative log entry certificate after it writes data to the cor-
rect DataNode. As we will see, this property is important in recovery. After
61
storing the log entry certificate, a DataNode or witness node replies to all
region servers, and a region server considers the procedure as complete if it
receives five replies. Any failure during the procedure, of course, will block
the execution and finally trigger recovery.
• Step ©4 . Each region server independently sends its vote (yes if Step 3 com-
pletes successfully and no otherwise) to the leader of the batch to which the
put belongs and, if it voted yes, waits for the decision. On receiving commit,
the region servers mark the request as committed, update their in-memory
state and generate a tentative put success certificate; on receiving abort
the region servers generate instead a tentative put failed certificate. A
client considers a request as complete if it receives a put success certificate,
which consists of three matching tentative put success certificates from
three region servers. Otherwise, the block driver triggers recovery if there is
a proof of misbehavior by any of the servers (e.g. no unanimous consent) or
retries the request if there is no such proof (e.g. timeout): the block driver also
triggers recovery if it retries a request several times but the servers still cannot
make progress. The put success certificate proves that at least one correct
region server believes that a correct log entry certificate has been success-
fully generated and stored, which indicates that all the correct DataNodes and
witness nodes must have already stored the log entry certificate.
Similar changes are also required to leverage active storage in flushing and
compaction. Unlike puts, these operations are initiated by the primary region
server: the other region servers use predefined deterministic criteria, such as the
current size of the memstore, to verify whether the proposed operation should be
performed. The writing protocol of flush and compaction, however, can be greatly
simplified: the RRSs only need to agree on a hash of the generated file at the end of












Figure 3.4: Merkle tree structure on client and region servers
reached. If a failure occurs, the Master node can simply delete the incomplete files
and instructs a new set of RRSs to retry the flush or compaction: we can do this
because data is already stored in the logs and can be recovered, a luxury obviously
not offered to log files.
3.3.3 End-to-end verification
Local file systems fail in unpredictable ways [87]. Distributed systems like HBase
are even more complex and are therefore more prone to failures. To provide strong
correctness guarantees, Salus implements end-to-end checks that (a) ensure that
clients access correct and current data and (b) do so without affecting performance:
gets can be processed at a single replica and yet retain the ability to identify
whether the returned data is correct and current.
Like many existing systems [3, 43, 69, 73], Salus’ mechanism for end-to-end
checks leverages Merkle trees [18,75], another type of metadata, to efficiently verify
the integrity of the state whose hash is at the tree’s root. Specifically, a client
accessing a volume maintains a Merkle tree on the volume’s blocks, called volume
tree, that is updated on every put and verified on every get.
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For fast recovery, Salus distributes a copy of the volume tree across the
region servers that host the volume so that, after a crash, a client can rebuild its
volume tree by contacting the region servers responsible for the regions in that
volume. Replicating the volume tree at the region servers also allows a client, if
it so chooses, to only store a subset of its volume tree during normal operation,
fetching on demand what it needs from the region servers serving its volume.
Since a volume can span multiple region servers, for scalability and load-
balancing each region server only stores and validates a region tree for the regions
that it hosts. The region tree is a sub-tree of the volume tree corresponding to the
blocks in a given region. In addition, to enable the client to recover the volume tree,
each region server also stores the hash for the root of the full volume tree generated
by the most recent update to a block in the region for which the server is responsible,
together with the sequence number of the put request that produced it.
Figure 3.4 shows a volume tree and its region trees. The client stores the
top levels of the volume tree that are not included in any region tree so that it can
easily fetch the desired region tree on demand. A client can also cache recently used
region trees for faster access.
To process a get request for a block, the client sends the request to any of
the region servers hosting that block. As shown in Figure 3.5, the response includes
a subset of the region tree (all non-cached nodes on the path from the target to the
root of the corresponding region tree, together with their siblings) sufficient for the
client to validate the response using the locally stored volume tree. If the check fails
(because of a commission failure) or if the client times out (because of an omission
failure), the client retries the get using another region server. If the get fails at
all region servers, the client contacts the Master triggering the recovery protocol
(Section 3.3.4). To process a put, the client updates its volume tree and sends the










Figure 3.5: Verifying a response with the Merkle tree: the client caches the whole
volume tree and part of the region tree and fetches a subset of the region tree to
verify the response.
the RRS. Attaching the root hash of the volume tree to each put request enables
clients to ensure that, despite commission failures, they will be able to mount and
access a consistent volume.
A client’s protocol to mount a volume after losing the volume tree is simple.
The client begins by fetching the region trees, the root hashes, and the corresponding
sequence numbers from the various RRSs. Before responding to a client’s fetch
request, a RRS commits any prepared puts pending to be committed using the
commit-recovery phase of the recovery protocol (Section 3.3.4). Using the sequence
numbers received from all the RRSs, the client identifies the most recent root hash
and compares it with the root hash of the volume tree constructed by combining
the various region trees. The check should always succeed as long as there are no
more than two failures.
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3.3.4 Recovery
The recovery protocol ensures that, despite commission or permanent omission fail-
ures in up to two physical servers, Salus continues to provide the abstraction of a
virtual disk with standard disk semantics.
To achieve this goal, Salus’ recovery protocol collects the longest available
prefix PC of prepared put requests that satisfy the ordered-commit property. Recall
from Section 3.3.2 that every put for which the client received a put success
certificate must appear in the log of at least one correct replica in the region that
processed that put. Hence, PC will contain all put requests for which the client
received a put success certificate, thus guaranteeing standard disk semantics.
Specifically, recovery must address two key issues.
Resolving log discrepancies Because of omission or commission failures,
different DataNodes within the same RRS may store different logs. A prepared put,
for example, may have been made persistent at one DataNode, but not at another.
Identifying committable requests Because commit decisions are logged
asynchronously, some puts for which a client received put success may not be
marked as committed in the logs. It is possible, for example, that a later put be
logged as committed when an earlier one is not; or that a suffix of puts for which
the client has received a put success be not logged as committed.
One major challenge in addressing these issues is that, while PC is defined
on a global volume log, Salus does not actually store any such log: instead, for
efficiency, each region keeps its own separate region log. Hence, after retrieving its
region log, a recovering region server needs to cooperate with other region servers
to determine whether the recovered region log is correct and whether the puts it
stores can be committed.
Figure 3.6 describes the protocol that Salus uses to recover faulty DataNodes
and region servers. The first two phases describe the recovery of individual region
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1 foreach failed-region i
2 remapRegion(i)
3 end
4 foreach failed-region i
5 region_logs[i] ← recoverRegionLog(region i)
6 end
7 LCP ← identifyLCP(region_logs)
8 rebuildVolume(LCP)
Figure 3.6: Pseudocode for the recovery protocol.
logs, while the last two phases describe how the RRSs coordinate to identify com-
mitable requests. Note that just as a local disk is unavailable during a post-failure
consistency check, so is a volume unavailable to its client during recovery.
1. Remap (remapRegion). As in HBase, when a RRS crashes or is reported by the
client as non-responsive, the Master swaps out the servers in that RRS and assigns
its regions to one or more replacement RRSs.
2. Recover region log (recoverRegionLog). To recover all prepared puts of a failed
region, the new region servers need to replay the region’s log. As shown in the
active storage protocol, Salus’ log is organized as a chain of entries, each containing
a log entry certificate and its corresponding data, which may contain a number of
puts and some additional information for HBase and HDFS. The recovery protocol
iterates these entries in three steps: ©1 the primary (first) region server in the new
RRS asks the corresponding three DataNodes and two witness nodes to provide the
log entry certificate at a specific position (which starts from zero and is updated if
an entry is successfully read) and waits for three valid responses. A response is valid
if it is a valid log entry certificate with proper signatures, file ID, and position,
or a message of “No next entry” properly signed. The primary region server is
guaranteed to get three valid responses, since there are at least three correct nodes.
©2 If at least one of the responses is a valid log entry certificate, the primary region
server tries to read the corresponding data from DataNodes. This read is guaranteed
to succeed because the log entry certificate proves that the data has already been
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stored on at least one correct DataNode; if all three responses are “No next entry”,
then the region server considers the log replaying as completed. ©3 In either case,
the primary region server forwards its decision together with the proof—the data
with log entry certificate or three properly signed “No next entry”s—to the other
region servers so that they can verify the decision. This procedure works exactly
as does unanimous consent in the active storage protocol. If the new region servers
reach unanimous consent, they write the data to a new file and garbage-collect the
old ones, as in HBase. Finally, if a log entry certificate is obtained in ©2 , meaning
that the log may have not been fully replayed yet, the protocol loops back to ©1 .
Otherwise, the protocol completes.
The protocol’s liveness is already briefly discussed above. We now briefly
prove the following safety property: if a put request completes successfully for a
client, then this put request is replayed in the correct order during the recovery
protocol described above. First, we prove that if a put completed successfully, it
must be replayed during recovery: recall that a client considers a put as complete
only after it receives a put success certificate, which proves that the corresponding
log entry certificate must have been stored on all correct DataNodes and witness
nodes. Therefore, in the recovery protocol, the primary region server must receive at
least one log entry certificate in ©1 , because it waits for three replies and at least
one of them must be from a correct DataNode or witness node. And the correct
log entry certificate proves that the data must be persistent on at least one correct
DataNode, and the region server can iterate all DataNodes to find the correct data.
Second, the order of replaying is guaranteed by the design of log entry certificate
itself because the certificate contains the position information and such information
is checked in ©1 . Note that a log may be split into multiple actual files on HDFS,
and the order of those files is determined by the timestamps in the names of these
files, which are stored on the trusted NameNode.
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3. Identify the longest commitable prefix (LCP) of the volume log (identifyLCP). If
the client is available, Salus can determine the LCP and the root of the corresponding
volume tree simply by asking the client. Otherwise, all RRSs must coordinate
to identify the longest prefix of the volume log that contains either committed or
prepared puts (i.e. puts whose data has been made persistent in at least one correct
DataNode). Since Salus keeps no physical volume log, the RRSs use ZooKeeper as a
means of coordination, as follows. The Master asks each RRS to report its maximum
committed sequence number as well as its list of prepared sequence numbers by
writing the requested information to a known file in ZooKeeper. Upon learning
from Zookeeper that the file is complete (i.e. all RRSs have responded),8 each RRS
uses the file to identify the longest prefix of committed and prepared puts in the
volume log. Finally, the sequence number of the last put in the LCP and the
attached Merkle tree root are written to ZooKeeper.
4. Rebuild volume state (rebuildVolume). This phase ensures that all puts in the
LCP are committed and available. The first half of the task is simple: if a put in
the LCP is prepared, then the corresponding region server marks it as committed.
With respect to availability, Salus makes sure that all puts in the LCP are available,
in order to reconstruct the volume consistently. To that end, the Master asks the
RRSs to replay their log and rebuild their region trees; it then uses the same checks
used by the client in the mount protocol (Section 3.3.3) to determine whether the
current root of the volume tree matches the one stored in ZooKeeper during Phase
3. The check should always succeed as long as there are no more than two failures
and it mainly serves as a sanity check.




We have implemented Salus by modifying HBase [12] and HDFS [95] to add pipelined
commit, active storage, and end-to-end checks. Our current implementation lags
behind our design in two ways. First, our prototype supports unanimous consent
between HBase and HDFS but not between HBase and ZooKeeper. Second, while
our design calls for a BFT-replicated Master, NameNode, and ZooKeeper, our pro-
totype does not yet incorporate these features. We intend to use UpRight [31] to
replicate NameNode, ZooKeeper, and Master. Implementing these features would
require a replicated state machine (RSM) to communicate with another RSM, which
looks simple but actually is not, and we are currently working on this problem in
another project [56].
Our evaluation tries to answer two basic questions. First, does Salus provide
the expected guarantees despite a wide range of failures? Second, given its stronger
guarantees, is Salus’ performance competitive with HBase? Figure 3.7 summarizes
the main results.
In the originally published version [106], Salus did not incorporate witness
nodes in the active storage protocol and a combination of concurrent errors could
cause it to lose a suffix of data [106]. The active storage protocol presented in
this dissertation eliminates this problem and guarantees that no data will be lost.
However, since we don’t have the resources to rerun all our original experiments,
most of the results presented in this section are still obtained with the old protocol.
We add an experiment at the end of the section to measure the additional overhead
of the new protocol.
3.4.1 Robustness
In this section, we evaluate Salus’ robustness, which includes guaranteeing freshness
for read operations and liveness and ordered-commit for all operations.
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Salus ensures freshness, ordered-commit, and liveness when there are no
more than 2 failures within any RRS and the corresponding DataNodes.
§3.4.1
Salus achieves comparable or better single-client throughput compared
to HBase with slightly increased latency.
§3.4.2
Salus’ active replication can reduce network usage by 55% and increase
aggregate throughput by 74% for sequential write workload compared
to HBase. Salus can achieve similar aggregate read throughput com-
pared to HBase.
§3.4.2
Salus’ overhead over HBase does not grow with the scale of the system. §3.4.2
Figure 3.7: Summary of main results.
Salus is designed to ensure these properties as long as there are no more than
two failures in the region servers within an RRS and their corresponding DataN-
odes, and fewer than a third of the nodes in the implementation of each of UpRight
NameNode, UpRight ZooKeeper, and UpRight Master nodes are incorrect; how-
ever, since we have not yet integrated in Salus UpRight versions of NameNode,
ZooKeeper, and Master, we only evaluate Salus’ robustness when DataNode or re-
gion server fails.
We test our implementation via fault injection. We introduce failures and
then observe what happens when we attempt to access the storage. For reference,
we compare Salus with HBase (which replicates stored data across DataNodes but
does not support pipelined commit, active storage, or end-to-end checks).
In particular, we inject faults into clients to force them to crash and restart.
We inject faults into DataNodes to force them either to temporarily or permanently
crash or to corrupt block data. We cause data corruption in both log files and
checkpoint files. We inject faults into region servers to force them to either 1) crash;
2) corrupt data in memory; 3) write corrupted data to HDFS; 4) refuse to process
requests or forward requests out of order; or 5) ask the NameNode to delete files.
Once again, we cause corruption in both log files and checkpoint files. Note that










































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.1: Robustness towards failures affecting the region servers within an RRS,
and their corresponding DataNodes. (- = not applicable, * = corresponding opera-
tions may not be live). Note that a region server failure has the potential to cause
the failure of the corresponding DataNode.
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First, as expected, when a client crashes and restarts in HBase, a volume’s
on-disk state can be left in an inconsistent state, because HBase does not guarantee
ordered commit. HBase can avoid these inconsistencies by blocking all requests that
follow a barrier request until the barrier completes, but this can hurt performance
when barriers are frequent (see Section 3.4.2). Second, HBase’s replicated DataN-
odes tolerate crash and benign file corruptions that alter the data but don’t affect
the checksum, which is stored separately. Thus, when considering only DataNode
failures, HBase provides the same guarantees as Salus. Third, HBase’s unreplicated
region server is a single point of failure, vulnerable to commission failures that can
violate freshness as well as ordered-commit.
In Salus, end-to-end checks ensure freshness for get operations in all the
scenarios covered in Figure 3.1: a correct client does not accept get reply unless
it can pass the Merkle tree check. Second, pipelined commit ensures the ordered-
commit property in all scenarios involving one or two failures, whether of omission
or of commission: if a client fails or region servers reorder requests, the out-of-order
requests will not be accepted and eventually recovery will be triggered, causing these
requests to be discarded. Third, active storage protects liveness failure scenarios
involving one or two region server/DataNode pairs: if a client receives an unexpected
get reply, it retries until it obtains the correct data. Furthermore, during recovery,
the recovering region servers find the correct log by using the certificates generated
by active storage protocol. As expected, ordered-commit and liveness cannot be
guaranteed if all replicas either permanently fail or experience commission failures.
3.4.2 Performance
Salus’ architecture can in principle result in both benefits and overhead when it
comes to throughput and latency: on the one hand, pipelined commit allows mul-
tiple batches to be processed in parallel and active storage reduces network band-
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width consumption. On the other hand, end-to-end checks introduce checksum
computations on both clients and servers; pipelined commit requires additional net-
work messages for preparing and committing; and active storage requires additional
computation and messages for certificate generation. Compared to the cost of disk-
accesses for data, however, we expect these overheads to be modest.
This section quantifies these tradeoffs using benchmarks for both sequential
and random access patterns and for both reads and writes. We compare Salus’
single-client throughput and latency, aggregate throughput, and network usage to
those of HBase. We also include measured numbers from Amazon EBS to put Salus’
performance in perspective.
Salus targets clusters of storage nodes with 10 or more disks each. In such an
environment, we expect a node’s aggregate disk bandwidth to be much larger than
its network bandwidth. Unfortunately, we have only three storage nodes matching
this description, the rest of our small nodes have a single disk and a single active
1Gbit/s network connection.
Most of our experiments run on a 15-node cluster of small nodes equipped
with a 4-core Intel Xeon X3220 2.40GHz CPU, 3GB of memory, and one West-
ern Digital WD2502ABYS 250GB hard drive. In these experiments, we use nine
small nodes as region servers and DataNodes, another small node as the Master,
ZooKeeper, and NameNode, and up to four small nodes acting as clients. In these
experiments, we set the Java heap size to 2GB for the region server and 1GB for
the DataNode.
To understand system behavior when disk bandwidth is more plentiful than
network bandwidth, we run several experiments using the three storage nodes, each
equipped with a 16-core AMD Opteron 4282 3.0GHz CPU, 64GB of memory, and
10 Western Digital WD1003FBYX 1TB hard drives. These storage nodes have
1Gbit/s networks, but the network topology constrains them to share an aggregate
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bandwidth of about 1.2Gbit/s.
To measure the scalability of Salus with a large number of machines, we run
several experiments on Amazon EC2 [8]. The detailed configuration is shown in the
“Scalability” section.
For all experiments, we use a small 4KB block size, which we expect to mag-
nify Salus’ overheads compared to larger block sizes. For read workloads, each client
formats the volume by writing all blocks and then forcing a flush and compaction
before the start of the experiments. For write workloads, since compaction intro-
duces significant overhead in both HBase and Salus and the compaction interval is
tunable, we first run these experiments with compaction disabled to measure the
maximum throughput; then we run HBase with its default compaction strategy and
measure how many bytes it reads for each compaction; finally, we tune Salus’ com-
paction interval so that Salus performs compaction on the same amount of data as
HBase.
Single client throughput and latency
We first evaluate the single-client throughput and latency of Salus. Since a single
client usually cannot saturate the system, we find that executing requests in a
pipeline is beneficial to Salus’ throughput. However, the additional overheads of
checksum computation and message transfer of Salus increase its latency.
We use the nine small nodes as servers and start a single client to issue
sequential and random reads and writes to the system. For the throughput experi-
ment, the client issues requests as fast as it can and performs batching to maximize
throughput. In all experiments, we use a batch size of 250 requests, so each batch
accesses about 1MB. For the latency experiment, the client issues a single request,
waits for it to return, and then waits for 10ms before issuing the next request.
Figure 3.8 shows the single client throughput. For sequential reads, Salus
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outperforms the HBase system with a speedup of 2.5. The reasons are that Salus’
three region servers increase parallelism for reads and that reads are pipelined to
have multiple batches outstanding; the HBase client instead issues only one batch
of requests at a time. For random reads, disk seeks are the bottleneck and HBase
and Salus have comparable performance.
For sequential writes and random writes, Salus is slower than HBase by 3.5%
to 22.8% for its stronger guarantees. For Salus, pipelined execution does not help
write throughput as much as it helps sequential reads, since write operations need
to be forwared to all three nodes and unlike reads cannot be executed in parallel.
As a sanity check, Figure 3.8 also shows the performance we measured from a
small compute instance accessing Amazon’s EBS. Because the EBS hardware differs
from our testbed hardware, we can only draw limited conclusions, but we note that
the Salus prototype achieves a respectable fraction of EBS’s sequential read and
write bandwidth, and that it modestly outperforms EBS’s random read throughput
(probably because it is utilizing more disk arms), and that it substantially out-
performs EBS’s random write throughput (probably because it transforms random
writes into sequential ones.)
Figure 3.9 shows the 90th-percentile latency for random reads and writes. In
both cases, Salus’ latency is within two or three milliseconds of that of HBase, which
is reasonable considering Salus’ additional work to perform Merkle tree calculations,
certificate generation, and network transfer. Note that, in the random write latency
experiment, the HBase DataNode does not call sync when performing disk writes:
that’s why its write latency is small. This may be a reasonable design decision when
the probability of three simultaneous crashes is small [71]. In this experiment, we
also show what happens when adding this call to both HBase and Salus: calling
sync adds more than 10ms of latency to both. To be consistent, we do not call sync



































































































































Figure 3.8: Single client throughput on small nodes. HBase-N and Salus-N disable
compactions. EBS’s numbers are measured on different hardwares and are included
for reference.
Again, as a sanity check we note that Salus (and HBase) are reasonably
competitive with EBS (though we emphasize again that EBS’s underlying hardware
is not known to us, so not too much should be read into this experiment.)
Overall, these results show that despite all the extra computation and mes-
sage transfers to achieve stronger guarantees, Salus’ single-client throughput and
latency are comparable to those of HBase, because the additional processing Salus
requires adds relatively little to the time required to complete disk operations. In
an environment in which computational cycles are plentiful, trading off, as Salus
does, processing for improved reliability appears to be a reasonable trade-off.
Aggregate throughput/network bandwidth
We then evaluate the aggregate throughput and network usage of Salus. The servers
are saturated in these experiments, so pipelined execution does not improve Salus’
throughput at all. On the other hand, we find that active replication of region














































































Figure 3.9: Single client latency on small nodes. HBase-S and Salus-S enable sync.
EBS’s numbers are measured on different hardwares and are included for reference.
nificantly improve performance when the total disk bandwidth exceeds the aggregate
network bandwidth.
Figure 3.10 reports experiments on our small-server testbed with nine nodes
acting as combined region server and DataNodes; we increase the number of clients
until the throughput does not increase.
For sequential read, both systems achieve about 110MB/s. Pipelining reads
in Salus does not improve aggregate throughput since also HBase has multiple clients
to parallelize network and disk operations. For random reads, disk seek and rotation
are the bottleneck, and both systems achieve only about 3MB/s.
The relative slowdowns of Salus versus HBase for sequential and random













































































































Figure 3.10: Aggregate throughput on small nodes. HBase-N and Salus-N disable
compactions.
HBase Salus
Throughput (MB/s) 27 47
Network consumption (network
bytes per byte written by the
client)
5.3 2.4
Table 3.2: Aggregate sequential write throughput and network bandwidth usage
with fewer server machines but more disks per machine.
when compaction is enabled, since compaction adds more disk operations to both
HBase and Salus. Salus reduces network bandwidth at the expense of higher disk
and CPU usage, but this trade-off does not help because disk and network bandwidth
are comparable. Even so, we find this to be an acceptable price for the stronger
guarantees provided by Salus.
Table 3.2 shows what happens when we run the sequential write experiment
using the three 10-disk storage nodes as servers. Here, the tables are turned and
Salus outperforms HBase (47MB/s versus 27MB/s). Our profiling shows that in
both experiments, the bottleneck is the network topology that constrains the aggre-




























































































Figure 3.11: Write throughput per server with nine servers and 108 servers (com-
paction disabled).
Table 3.2 also compares the network bandwidth usage of HBase and Salus
under the sequential write workload. HBase sends more than five bytes for each
byte written by the client (two network transfers each for logging and flushing, but
fewer than two for compaction, since some blocks are overwritten.) Salus only uses
two bytes per byte written to forward the request to replicas; logging, flushing,
and compaction are performed locally. The actual number is slightly higher than
two, because of Salus additional metadata. Salus halves network bandwidth usage
compared to HBase, which explains why its throughput is 74% higher than that
HBase when network bandwidth is limited.
Note that we do not measure the aggregate throughput of EBS because we
do not know its internal architecture and thus we do not know how to saturate it.
Scalability
In this section we evaluate the degree to which the mechanisms that Salus uses to
achieve its stronger robustness guarantees impact its scalability. Growing by an
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order of magnitude the size of the testbed used in our previous experiments, we run
Salus and HBase on Amazon EC2 [8] with up to 108 servers. While short of our
goal of showing conclusively that Salus can scale to thousands of servers, we believe
these experiments can offer insights on the relevant trends.
For our testbed we use EC2’s extra large instances, with DataNodes and
region servers configured to use 3GB of memory each. Some preliminary tests run
to measure the characteristics of our testbed show that each EC2 instance can reach
a maximum network and disk bandwidth of about 100MB/s, meaning that network
bandwidth is not a bottleneck; thus, we do not expect Salus to outperform HBase
in this setting.
Given our limited resources, we focus our attention on measuring the through-
put of sequential and random writes: we believe this is reasonable since the only
additional overhead for reads are the end-to-end checks performed by the clients,
which are easy to make scalable. We run each experiment with an equal number of
clients and servers and for each 11-minute-long experiment we report the throughput
of the last 10 minutes.
Because we do not have full control over EC2’s internal architecture, and
because one user’s virtual machines in EC2 may share resources such as disks and
networks with other users, these experiments have limitations: the performance of
EC2’s instances fluctuates noticeably and it becomes hard to even determine what
the stable throughput for a given experimental configuration is. Further, while
in most cases, as expected, we find that HBase performs better than Salus, some
experiments show Salus with a higher throughput than HBase, possibly because the
network is being heavily used and pipelined commit helps Salus handle high network
latencies more efficiently: to be conservative, we report only results for which HBase
performs better than Salus.
Figure 3.11 shows the per-server throughput of the sequential and random
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write workloads in configuration with nine and 108 servers. For the sequential write
workload, the throughput per server remains almost unchanged in both HBase and
Salus as we move from nine to 108 servers, meaning that for this workload both
systems are perfectly scalable up to 108 servers. For the random write workload,
however, both HBase and Salus experience a significant drop in throughput-per-
server when the number of servers grows. The culprit is the high number of small
I/O operations that this workload requires. As the number of server increases, the
number of requests randomly assigned to each server in a sub-batch decreases, even
as increasing the number of clients causes each server to process more sub-batches.
The net result is that as the number of server increases, each server performs an ever
larger number of ever smaller-sized I/O operations—which of course hurts perfor-
mance. Note however that the extent of Salus’ slowdown with respect to HBase is
virtually the same (about 28%) in both the 9-server and the 108-server experiments,
meaning that Salus’ overhead does not grow with the scale of the system.
Pipeline commit
Salus achieves increased parallelism by pipelining puts across barrier operations—
Salus’ puts always commit in the order they are issued, so the barriers’ constraints
are satisfied without stalling the pipeline. Figure 3.12 compares HBase and Salus
by varying the number of operations between barriers. Salus’ throughput remains
constant at 18 MB/s as it is not affected by barriers, whereas HBase’s throughput
suffers with increasing barrier frequency: HBase achieves 3MB/s with a batch size
of one and 14 MB/s with a batch size of 32.
Overhead of writing to witness nodes
To measure the overhead of Salus’ new active storage protocol, which stores certifi-





















Figure 3.12: Single client sequential write throughput as the frequency of barriers
varies.
to that of our earlier active storage protocol [106], which stores certificates on only
three DataNodes. We perform this set of experiments on 12 servers, each equipped
with 16 cores, 64GB of memory, and a single disk, and increase the number of clients
until the system is saturated. Since witness nodes are only accessed for writes, we
only measure write throughputs in these experiments.
Figure 3.13 shows that the aggregate throughput of the new protocol is com-
parable to that of the old protocol under both the sequential and the random write
workloads. This result once again confirms one of the basic ideas of this disserta-
tion: for storage systems processing large bulk of data, adding a small metadata












































Figure 3.13: Overhead of storing metadata on additional witness nodes. The “New”
protocol stores certificates on witness nodes while the “Old” protocol does not.
3.5 Conclusions
Salus is a distributed block store that offers an unprecedented combination of scal-
ability and robustness. Surprisingly, Salus’ robustness does not come at the cost
of performance: pipelined commit allows updates to proceed at high speed while
ensuring that the system’s committed state is consistent; end-to-end checks allow
reading from one replica safely; and active replication not only eliminates reliability
bottlenecks but also eases performance bottlenecks.
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Chapter 4
Exalt: A Tool to Evaluate
Large-Scale Storage Systems
Exalt is a library that gives back to researchers the ability to verify the scalability
claims of today’s large storage systems, which, ironically, have become hard to
corroborate precisely because of the scale of these systems.
The advent of Big Data has strained the scalability of traditional storage
systems, and several new architectures have been proposed to respond to this chal-
lenge [12,23,27,32,44,60,82,95] by supporting up to hundreds of petabytes of storage
and tens of thousands of storage nodes. Testing systems at such scale, however, re-
quires access to tens of thousands of machines and at least as many disks, and few
researchers have access to resources that plentiful: the rest of us have to design
systems that are supposed to operate at a scale much larger than the infrastructure
available to test them. Nor are such resource limitations affecting only academia:
even industrial researchers at organizations with clusters of the necessary size may
not be able to reserve them for large scale experiments, since these clusters are a
primary source of revenue.
These limitations are typically sidestepped in one of two ways. The first is to
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run experiments on a medium-sized cluster (100-200 machines) and extrapolate the
results to larger scales. Although this approach may work reasonably well in some
cases, the fundamental assumption on which it rests—that resource consumption
increases linearly with the load and the number of machines in the system—does
not always hold, as we show in Section 4.1. To make matters worse, sources of non-
linear growth are sometimes hard or impossible to observe in small deployments.
For example, the time needed to add a new block to an HDFS file [95] increases
with the file’s size, but it is only after that size has grown beyond what is likely to
be observable in small deployments that the slowdown becomes a limiting factor for
the system’s performance.
The second common approach for predicting the behavior of large-scale sys-
tems is simulation [83, 98, 103, 110]. Unfortunately, the results of a simulation are
only as accurate as the model on which the simulation relies; as systems grow in
size and complexity, modeling them faithfully becomes prohibitive.
This dissertation proposes a third way: the Exalt library offers researchers
the ability to test the scalability of a large-scale storage system by running its real
code, but without requiring access to thousands of machines. The basic insight at
the core of Exalt is that, in many large-scale experiments, how data is processed
is not affected by the content of the data being written, but only by its metadata,
such as its size. Exalt leverages this freedom by virtualizing the data, while keep-
ing the metadata intact to ensure that the system continues to function correctly.
Specifically, the format that Exalt clients use to write data, which we call Tardis,
has two key advantages. First, it allows Exalt to compress the behavior of the sys-
tem in both space and time. Space compression is a powerful tool for performing
large-scale experiments: for example, running 10,000 storage nodes on just 100 ma-
chines can bring to light previously unknown scalability bottlenecks in the metadata
service. Since compressed data takes much less time to write, compression in space
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can in turn result in compression in time: with the system running faster, bugs and
performance issues can be discovered more rapidly.
The second key advantage of Tardis is that it addresses a fundamental chal-
lenge in virtualizing data: being able to distinguish data from metadata. While
the content of the former is not important for the system to function correctly and
can therefore be virtualized, the integrity of the latter is essential. This problem is
particularly prominent in modern storage systems, which employ a two-layer archi-
tecture where the upper layer uses the lower layer as black-box storage: files written
to the lower layer contain both data and metadata, which look indistinguishable to
the lower layer. The need to ensure the integrity of the metadata is why approaches
that virtualize data by altogether disposing of file contents (e.g. [6]) cannot be used
in our context.
In summary we make the following contributions:
• We introduce Tardis, a data representation scheme that allows data to be
identified and efficiently compressed even at lower-level storage layers that are
not aware of the semantics and formatting used by higher levels of the system.
Tardis provides transparent, lossless, computationally efficient compression of
data and achieves high compression ratios.
• We present a methodology that utilizes Tardis to test the scalability and ro-
bustness of large-scale storage systems: our goal is not to predict every as-
pect of the performance of such systems (e.g. their power consumption) but,
more modestly, to identify scalability problems. Our approach has a “Tru-
man-show” [101] feel: the part of the system whose scalability is being tested
processes real data and interacts with the rest of the system as it would in
a true large-scale deployment, while the rest of the system uses Tardis to
compress data and achieve high degrees of colocation, thereby emulating the
behavior of a large number of nodes.
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• We present our experience using Exalt, a library that implements Tardis and
uses our methodology to identify scalability issues in large-scale storage sys-
tems. Using Exalt we found several such issues in three mature storage sys-
tems: HDFS [95], HBase [12], and Cassandra [60], and fixed a subset of them.
All the problems we identified manifest when the scale of the system becomes
larger than a typical research cluster. In the case of HDFS, resolving these
problems resulted in an order of magnitude improvement of the aggregate
system throughput. Our ability to identify these issues was not, for better
or worse, due to a prior deep understanding, but rather to the opportunity
offered by Exalt to test them at an unprecedented scale.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses the
common practices for testing the scalability of large systems. Section 4.2 introduces
the Tardis data representation scheme and Section 4.3 describes how it can be used
to identify scalability problems in large-scale systems. Section 4.4 reviews the as-
sumptions of Exalt and discusses its applicability in various contexts. Section 4.5
presents our experience using Exalt to identify performance problems in three ma-
ture systems: HDFS, HBase, and Cassandra. Section 4.6 concludes our discoveries
of Exalt.
4.1 Testing for scalability: common practices
When faced with the challenge of running experiments on a system whose scale vastly
exceeds their infrastructure, researchers typically resort to one of two options: they
either run the system at the largest scale they can afford and try to extrapolate
their results, or they explicitly forgo running certain components of the system,
substituting them with stubs that, ideally, maintain the interactions of the original
components with the rest of the system, but are simpler and less resource-demanding
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to run. We discuss both options, and why they are not well-suited for performing
scalability tests on large-scale systems.
4.1.1 Extrapolation
A common approach to estimate the behavior of systems that are too big to test
is to run them at a small or medium scale and then to extrapolate, based on those
results, how they will behave at a large scale. For example, if the CPU utilization
of a bottleneck node is 10% in a 100-node experiment, extrapolation would lead one
to estimate that the system will scale to about 1,000 nodes. While attractive for its
simplicity, this approach has several drawbacks that make it inaccurate in practice.
First, extrapolation is based on the assumption that resource usage grows
linearly with the scale of the system. However, because of design choices and imple-
mentation issues, this assumption is frequently violated in practice. For example,
HDFS uses an array to maintain a sorted list of files within a directory. Using an
array causes insertion to be an O(N) operation, where N is the number of files in the
directory. As more files are added to the directory, insertion becomes increasingly
expensive: indeed, the cost of adding N files to a directory is O(N2) . Note that
a more efficient directory implementation (e.g. a sorted tree map) does not restore
linear growth in resource usage, but simply reduces the growth rate to O(N · logN).
In general, once the load on the system is not linear, accurate extrapolation becomes
much harder, especially because, as we have seen, the system’s performance may
depend on the details of the implementation.
A second, more subtle drawback of extrapolation is that at small scales some
important behaviors can easily escape notice. Consider again the above example of
a workload of O(N2) complexity: as long as the value of N is low, the potential
scalability bottleneck remains largely inconspicuous. To exacerbate the problem,
measuring resource utilization is an inherently noisy process. For example, observ-
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ing that a Java process uses 100MB of memory does not, by itself, indicate how
much memory is being used by the data structures of that process. Answering that
question requires accurate information about the amount of memory used internally
by the JVM, the amount of non-garbage-collected memory, etc. The uncertainty
added by measurement noise is significantly more prominent at lower scales, where
resource utilization is low.
The final drawback, which is closely related to the previous one, is that
extrapolation cannot be used to predict behaviors that are only triggered when some
resource utilization reaches a certain threshold. For example, HDFS has a blocking
disk-scanning procedure that becomes increasingly expensive as the system grows
in size. Beyond a certain size, running the procedure causes the corresponding
DataNode to start missing heartbeats, which in turn can cause it to be evicted and
force all its data to be re-replicated, with serious performance repercussions.
4.1.2 Using stubs
Another technique for predicting the performance of a system too big to test is to em-
ulate, rather than actually run, some of its components. The emulated components
are implemented as stubs, running either locally or remotely. For this approach
to be successful, the stubs should be simple to implement and require much more
modest resources than the original components they stand in for; at the same time,
they should be able to correctly exercise the rest of the system, allowing it to be
stress-tested at scale using relatively modest resources.
While attractive in theory, the promises of emulation are often elusive in
practice: reproducing accurately the behavior of a non-trivial real system component
is hard, and in the process the stub component can end up being almost as complex
as the real one, defeating its purpose.
We faced this challenge first-hand when trying to test the scalability of the
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HDFS NameNode using stub DataNodes. In particular, our goal was to create
a large number of stub DataNodes and use them to stress-test the NameNode.
Our first attempt did not involve the DataNodes in the protocol at all; to create
files and add blocks to them, clients simply invoked createFile and addBlock at
the NameNode. However, the system did not work, since the NameNode expects
the DataNodes to confirm the receipt of each block. We therefore modified our
clients to notify the stub DataNodes, so they could in turn appropriately notify
the NameNode. This did not work, either: the NameNode, we discovered, also
expects each DataNode to periodically report the list of blocks it stores on disk.
After several frustrating iterations, we eventually came to realize that emulating
the correct behavior of DataNodes would have required us to reimplement the full
HDFS protocol, including all inter-DataNode communication, local bookkeeping,
etc.
4.2 Compressing data with Tardis
Our approach is based on a simple intuition: for the purposes of testing the scala-
bility of large-scale storage systems, it is typically the size of the data being written
that matters, not its actual content. We are then free to choose what data clients
write during our tests: our work explores the opportunities that this freedom affords.
Specifically, our approach is to design a data format that achieves fast and
efficient compression and decompression. As we discuss in Section 4.2.3, using com-
pressed data lets us colocate multiple nodes on the same machine, which in turn
enables running large-scale experiments on a small infrastructure.
Before presenting Tardis, our compression scheme, we set forth the require-
ments that it must fulfill.
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Figure 4.1: Examples of the Tardis format in compressed and uncompressed form.
4.2.1 Compression scheme requirements
The scheme must be lossless. While compression can reduce resource
usage and allow node colocation, the ability to recreate the original data is essential.
Modern large-scale storage systems typically use a two-layer architecture, where the
upper layer uses the lower as a black-box storage [12, 23, 27]. What appears like
generic data to the lower storage layer may actually be metadata necessary for the
correct functioning of the upper layer; it is critical that none of this metadata be
lost.
The scheme must achieve a high compression ratio. The motivation
for this requirement is straightforward, since the compression ratio directly affects
the amount of colocation we can achieve.
The scheme must be computationally efficient. As a counterexample,
consider a straw-man scheme in which clients simply write sequences of 0’s. This
scheme offers obvious opportunities for significant compression; however, if it is
possible for the system to interleave client data with metadata, the compression
algorithm would need to scan all the input bytes to determine where the sequence
of 0’s begins and where it ends. The disk and network bottlenecks would have been
removed, but at the expense of introducing a CPU bottleneck, severely limiting the
scalability of this scheme.
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Data chunks should be independently compressible. Modern storage
systems do not necessarily store data as a single unit, but instead split it into multi-
ple, separately stored chunks, which must be independently compressible. Meeting
this requirement is challenging, however, since a client in general has no control over
how data is divided into chunks. For example, in HBase the procedure of splitting
data into chunks depends on a non-deterministic race between multiple threads.
4.2.2 Tardis compression
We introduce a novel compression scheme, called Tardis, that satisfies the above
requirements. Tardis consists of a data format and an algorithm for compressing
and decompressing the data. Intuitively, Tardis aims to achieve the following two
complementary goals. When no metadata is inserted in the middle of the data, the
compression algorithm should be able to compress the entire data after scanning
only a small fraction of it. Otherwise, the compression algorithm should be able to
quickly identify the location of the inserted metadata.
Data format Clients write data as a series of <flag> <marker> entries,
where <flag> is a predefined byte sequence that does not appear in the system
metadata, and <marker> denotes the number of remaining bytes in the data. For
example, using a 4-byte flag and 4-byte markers, 1KB of data would be formatted
as:
<flag>1016<flag>1008...<flag>8<flag>0
In this example, the first marker denotes that there are 1016 bytes remaining in the
sequence, since the (first) flag and the marker itself are 4 bytes each. Of course, the
size of flags and markers need not be the same: our prototype uses 8-byte flags and
4-byte markers.
Compressed data format Given a byte sequence in the above format, the
compression algorithm would simply need to return its length. However, to enable
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data chunks to be independently compressible, the algorithm actually returns two
numbers: the starting byte of the sequence as well as its length. In the above example
(also illustrated in Figure 4.1a), if the entire 1KB of data were being compressed,
the result would be the pair (1024,1024). If, however, the data were split into two
chunks of 512 bytes each (Figure 4.1b), the first chunk would be compressed as
(1024,512) and the second as (512,512).
As we discussed above, in modern storage systems data and metadata are
frequently stored together. Figure 4.1c shows an example where metadata is inserted
in the middle of a Tardis sequence. In this case, the metadata splits the original
sequence into two subsequences, of length 20 and 1004, respectively. Ideally, we
would like to compress each of these sequences separately, leaving the metadata
uncompressed. However, since in this case the metadata is inserted in the middle of
a flag-marker pair, we simply leave these 8 bytes—the flag and the corresponding
marker—uncompressed.1 This shortens the first subsequence to a length of 16 and
the second subsequence to 1000. Note that even if the metadata were not aligned
with the flags and markers, the result would be the same: only the flag-marker
pair that is split by the metadata is left uncompressed and the rest of the data is
compressed as two separate subsequences.
To distinguish between compressed and uncompressed data during decom-
pression, an uncompressed sequence is preceded by a 0 and a 4-byte integer denoting
its length, while a compressed sequence is preceded by a 1.
Compression Figure 4.2 shows the pseudocode for the Tardis compression
algorithm. The main function, TardisCompress, calls the FindSubsequence func-
tion iteratively until all input data has been consumed. When FindSubsequence
returns a new subsequence (line 7), the main function appends the appropriate
bytes to the compressed data buffer. We detect the presence of metadata between
1It is actually possible to include the flag in the compressed sequence, but we omit this opti-
mization for simplicity of presentation.
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1 #define unit_size = flag_size + marker_size
3 (compressed_data) TardisCompress(data)
4 result = empty buffer
5 index = 0
6 while index < data.len
7 (pos,marker,len)=FindSubsequence(data,index)




12 if pos > index
13 result.AppendMeta(data,index,pos-index)
14 result.AppendTardis(marker,len)
15 index = pos+len
16 return result
18 (pos,marker,length) FindSubsequence(data,startIndex)
19 (pos,marker) = ScanForFlag(data,startIndex)
20 if pos == -1
21 return (-1,-1,-1)
22 lastMarker = data.len-(unit_size+(data.len-pos)%unit_size)
23 target = min(pos+marker,lastMarker)
24 marker2 = BinarySearch in data from pos to target
25 for the rightmost flag-marker pair such that:
26 (pos2,marker2) = ScanForFlag(data,target) and
27 pos2 != -1 and pos2-pos == marker-marker2
28 return (pos, marker, marker-marker2+unit_size)
29 if no such marker2 is found
30 return (-1,-1,-1)
32 (position, marker) ScanForFlag(data, startIndex)
33 index = linearly search data for (flag,marker) starting at startIndex
34 if index >= 0
35 return (index, marker)
36 else
37 return (-1, -1)
Figure 4.2: Pseudocode for Tardis compression.
two subsequences by checking whether the starting position of the new subsequence
(pos) is after the end of the previous subsequence (index ). If so, we append a 0 to
denote the beginning of an uncompressed sequence, followed by the length of the
metadata, and finally by the metadata itself, uncompressed (AppendMeta, line 13).
It is then time to add the new subsequence. To denote that what follows is
compressed, we append a 1 before the compressed form of the Tardis subsequence
(which, recall, consists of the starting point and length of the subsequence) (Ap-
pendTardis, line 14).
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Function FindSubsequence is the core of the algorithm: its task is to identify
a Tardis subsequence. Two factors complicate this task: the sequence may have
been split into multiple chunks and metadata may have been inserted somewhere
in the sequence. Given a starting index in the data, FindSubsequence first scans
the data to find the first flag, indicating the start of a Tardis sequence, and reads
the corresponding marker (line 19). Then, it checks whether some metadata has
been added in the middle of this sequence. The check is simple: if no metadata
is inserted between two markers with values A and B, then these markers should
be placed B − A bytes apart. The purpose of lines 22-23 is to determine which
marker should serve as marker B. If the original sequence is not split across chunks,
then B is marker 0, which should be m bytes after the first marker, where m is
the value of the first marker. Otherwise, B is set to the last marker of the current
chunk. If the difference between the values of markers B and A is indeed equal to
the byte distance between the markers, the algorithm has found an uninterrupted
Tardis subsequence. If that is not the case, the algorithm performs a binary search
to find the rightmost flag-marker pair that satisfies the above condition, leveraging
the fact that the values of the markers form a sorted sequence (lines 24-30).
In practice, the common case is very simple: as long as there is no metadata
inserted in the byte sequence, the compression algorithm needs only to check the
first and last number of the sequence. This allows Tardis to compress data much
faster than off-the-shelf compression algorithms. For example, when compressing
data chunks of 1MB, Tardis is about 33,000 times faster than Gzip [50] and 2,300
times faster than the straw man compression scheme where client data consists
only of 0’s and the compression algorithm simply scans the data and compresses
sequences of 0’s into an integer denoting their length. Of course, the comparison to
Gzip is not apples-to-apples, since Gzip is a generic compression algorithm; what it
does show, however, is that being able to choose the data format drastically reduces
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the CPU overhead of our approach.
Decompression The decompression algorithm is straightforward. Given a
compressed sequence, it iterates through each sequence, whether compressed (pre-
ceded by a 1) or uncompressed (preceded by a 0 and the length of the sequence). Un-
compressed sequences are copied without modification, while compressed sequences
are expanded to their uncompressed form.
Choosing the flag To prevent portions of metadata from being accidentally
compressed, the flag sequence should never appear in the metadata. If it did and, by
unlucky coincidence, the length value following the fake flag pointed to another flag
followed by a 0, all that sequence of bytes would be compressed. Although we could
altogether eliminate this danger,2 it seems unnecessary: Exalt is not intended for
production use, and an accidental compression would simply require us to rerun the
affected experiment. With a sufficiently large flag, the odds of a false positive can
be driven arbitrarily low: our pragmatic approach was to choose as flag an 8-byte
random sequence and take our chances. Our experiments have yet to produce a
false positive.
4.2.3 Using compression to enable large-scale tests
Since we are attempting to run a large number of nodes on a much smaller number of
machines, we will necessarily have to colocate multiple nodes on the same machine.
However, such colocation will cause significant contention on the physical resources
of the machine. Specifically, the disk- and memory capacity, and the disk- and
network bandwidth available to each machine are typically enough to support only
a single node, making straightforward colocation infeasible.
Data compression can help here: storing compressed data on disk decreases
2It would suffice to escape the flag sequence in the metadata. However, this would require
intrusive modifications to the server code, as all metadata insertions would need to be aware of the
escaping logic.
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the disk capacity and bandwidth requirements of each node, as well as memory
capacity and network bandwidth. Of course, data compression is not without cost;
in this case, the cost is CPU utilization.
This tradeoff, however, is very attractive for storage systems, where CPU
cycles are plentiful and bandwidth and storage capacity are typically the system’s
bottleneck. It also opens the door to emulating the behavior of storage systems too
big to test using HPC computation clusters: indeed, as we will see in Section 4.5,
our analysis of the scalability of HDFS/HBase/Cassandra has been performed by
running Exalt on the Stampede high performance cluster at the Texas Advanced
Computing Center (TACC) [97].
If data compression is used without colocation, it results in a system that
is “compressed” in time, rather than space, since each write will take less time
to complete. Running the system at an accelerated pace offers the potential of
identifying bugs or performance problems much faster: Section 4.5.1 discusses a
case where time compression allowed us to identify a problematic behavior about
100 times faster than in a real deployment.
4.2.4 Implementation
Our implementation of Exalt performs data compression for three key resources:
disk, network, and memory. Our goal is to be minimally intrusive. While in-
memory compression does require minor modifications to the source code of the
storage system being tested, we achieve fully transparent disk and network compres-
sion by using byte code instrumentation (BCI) to modify the relevant Java library
classes (Socket, SocketInputStream, SocketOutputStream, SocketChannel for net-
work compression; File, FileInputStream, FileOutputStream, RandomAccessFile,
and FileChannel for on-disk compression).
File compression is more challenging than network compression because the
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file interface allows a user to partially update existing data. When that data is
already compressed, updating it in place is not straightforward. A naive solution
would be to decompress the existing data, update it, and compress it again. How-
ever, if the old and the newly compressed data have different sizes, all following
data chunks would have to be moved. To address this problem, similarly to the
Log-Structured File System (LFS) [90], we transform in-place update operations
into append operations. This allows us to efficiently process in-place updates, with
only a small bookkeeping overhead to keep track of the latest version of each range
of bytes.
Memory compression In-memory data structures do not use a well-defined
interface, such as the File or Socket abstractions used by the disk and network. As
a result, transparently modifying these data structures to compress and decompress
data at the application layer is very hard.3 Instead, when the in-memory data needs
to be compressed, we manually modify the source code of the system. Fortunately,
this process is quite simple. One needs only identify the data structures that hold the
client data. When data is stored in the data structure, it is compressed; when data
is retrieved from the data structure, it is decompressed. For example, compressing
the in-memory key-value store of HBase required adding 71 lines of code across four
files.
4.3 Finding scalability bottlenecks
Data compression gives us the ability to colocate multiple nodes on a single physical
machine: in this section, we discuss how we can selectively use this ability to draw
meaningful conclusions about the scalability of a large-scale storage system. We will
view the system as a collection of real and emulated nodes. A real node runs the
3Transparent compression of in-memory data could be potentially implemented at the kernel
level, but it would sacrifice portability.
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system’s actual code and handles unmodified data. An emulated node still runs the
system’s actual code, but, as needed to support colocation, may (i) store compressed
data on its disk, (ii) send compressed data over the network, when it communicates
with other emulated nodes, and (iii) store compressed data in memory.
4.3.1 Exalt methodology
We use this combination of real and emulated nodes as a microscope of sorts that
we can focus on a part of the system to identify performance bottlenecks. To
ensure that the part of the system “under inspection” behaves as it would in a real
large-scale deployment, we leave the corresponding nodes real, while using emulated
nodes for the rest of the system. This approach works particularly well at identifying
performance issues at centralized components that can become a bottleneck as the
scale of the system increases (e.g. HDFS NameNode, HBase Master). Section 4.5
discusses our experience using this technique to find scalability problems in real
systems.
A downside of this methodology is that it may not discover scalability prob-
lems that arise at the nodes that are being emulated. To address this issue, after
having stress-tested the part of the system under inspection by using the maximum
amount of colocation for emulated nodes, we perform a new set of experiments
where a small subset of formerly emulated nodes are also run as real, while the rest
is kept emulated. This hybrid configuration makes it possible to identify scalability
problems also at nodes that are not under inspection, while maintaining a high de-
gree of colocation, but it is not a panacea: for example, it is still unable to detect
performance issues that only manifest when a large number of nodes that are not
under inspection perform some collective action (e.g. system-wide recovery).
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4.4 Limitations and applicability
Exalt relies on a number of assumptions to provide high-degrees of node colocation.
This section reviews these assumptions and discusses which of them can be weakened
to widen the applicability of our approach.
Exalt is primarily designed to evaluate I/O-intensive applications like dis-
tributed file systems storing large files [44, 95] or key-value stores with relatively
large values [23, 82]. Applications that are not I/O-intensive or store small values
cannot benefit significantly from Tardis, as they gain little by compressing data. In
Section 4.5.2 we explore in more detail how the size of the value in a key-value store
affects the colocation ratio of Exalt.
Our current implementation of Exalt makes two additional assumptions:
first, that the target application does not modify the data written by the clients,
although it can split the data and insert metadata; and second, that experiments
are not sensitive to the contents of the data, so that benchmarks can operate with
synthetic data.
While these assumptions hold for the systems we have so far applied Exalt
to, they are not fundamentally required for Exalt to be applicable. We consider
below some popular techniques that violate these assumptions and discuss how our
implementation of Exalt can be modified to work in conjunction with them.
Encryption and erasure coding Both techniques involve encoding data
into a different format, violating the assumption that client data is immutable. To
handle these cases, Exalt would compress the data using Tardis before encoding
it, and then add filler bytes as necessary to match the length of the (encoded)
original data. Filler bytes would use the same format as Tardis (making them highly
compressible), but with a different flag sequence (so that they can be distinguished
from real data). When reading the data, Exalt would remove the filler bytes before
performing decryption and then decompress the Tardis sequence to obtain the client
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data.
Deduplication Deduplication compares the contents of different data units
(files, chunks, etc.) to eliminate duplicates and, by making execution dependent on
the actual data, violates our second assumption. Indeed, deduplication schemes that
directly compare the units’ data are incompatible with Exalt. However, Exalt can
still be applied to deduplication approaches that only compare hashes of data units.
Exalt would first compute the hash of the client data and then replace the client
data with data formatted using an extended version of Tardis, which inserts the
hash of the data unit between the flag and the marker. The deduplication module
could then use this hash directly to identify duplicate data units.
Compression If the system being tested already uses compression, it is in
general not possible to use synthetic data at the clients, since the compression ratio
depends on the actual data. If, however, compression is performed only at the client
side, Exalt could apply a technique similar to the one used to handle encryption
and erasure coding: the client would first compress the real data to determine
its compressed size, then create synthetic (Tardis) data, compress it using Tardis’
compression and finally append the right amount of filler bytes to match the length
of the (compressed) real data.
Data sensitive applications Many applications use SQL-like languages
for their queries. The execution of these queries depends on the data, since SQL
predicates can be expressed as a function of the data. The rest of the data, which
does not affect the processing of the queries, can be synthetic. The efficiency of
Exalt in these cases depends on the ratio of sensitive to non-sensitive data.
4.5 Case studies
Exalt allows us to evaluate storage systems at an unprecedented scale. This section
presents our experience applying Exalt to evaluate three real-world storage systems:
102
the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [95], the HBase key-value store [12],
and the Cassandra key-value store [60]. We chose these systems for several reasons.
First, not only they are popular in their own right, especially among researchers,
but their architectures are representative of a broad range of existing large-scale
storage systems. Second, all systems are open-source, which allows us to perform
code modifications where necessary (i.e. for in-memory compression). Finally, all
systems have a large development community that has produced a mature and stable
codebase. Despite the maturity of the code, we identified several performance issues
that arise as the scale of the system increases. Our ability to diagnose these issues
was not due to a prior deeper understanding of these systems, but simply to the
ability to evaluate them at an unprecedented scale.
In our evaluation, we run HDFS and HBase at a scale about 100 times larger
than the size of the infrastructure available to us. For example, one of our ex-
periments uses 96 machines to run an HDFS cluster with 9600 DataNodes. Our
experiments identify a number of performance problems that arise at such large
scales. Some of these problems pertain to low-level implementation details, while
others are due to high-level design choices. For example, we find that storing many
files on an HDFS directory causes file creations to that directory to become increas-
ingly slow; and that keeping less than 34 of the region data in the memory of an
HBase region server causes its performance to degrade precipitously. Using Exalt,
we were able to identify and fix many of these problems, improving as a result
the aggregate HDFS throughput by an order of magnitude. Our experience with
Cassandra is different: the scalability of Cassandra is so limited that its scalability
problems can be identified even without the help of Exalt.
Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to validate our results by running
the actual systems at a large scale: after all, it is the very reason that we do not
have access to such plentiful resources that has motivated our work in the first place.
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The largest validation we have performed involved running HDFS on 1,500 nodes
of the Stampede cluster at the Texas Advanced Computing Center [97]: while our
results confirm the prediction of Exalt for that configuration, the scale of the system
is still too small to exhibit even the first of the scalability issues identified by Exalt.
Our current confidence in Exalt’s effectiveness stems from two sources. First, for
each problem that Exalt has identified, we have traced the cause of the problem in
the source code and, if possible, we fixed it and run the modified system to confirm
that its performance has been improved. Second, some of our findings have been
confirmed by engineers at Facebook, among the few who have access to a large-scale
deployment of HDFS [39].
Most of our experiments were performed on the Stampede cluster at TACC,
whose machines have 16 cores, 32GB of memory, but only 80GB of local disk storage.
Since our access to TACC was limited, we ran some of our experiments on three local
machines with 16 cores, 64GB memory and ten 1TB disks each. These machines
were used to test the capacity limitations of individual storage nodes.
4.5.1 Case study: HDFS
HDFS [95] is an open source implementation of the Google File System (GFS) [44].
Each HDFS cluster contains a single NameNode that stores the file system names-
pace information and several DataNodes that store the file contents. Each file is
split into multiple blocks and each block is stored on three DataNodes. When a
client creates a file or adds a block to an existing file, it first contacts the NameN-
ode, which responds with a list of the DataNodes that will store the new block. The
client can then directly write the block contents to these DataNodes.
We mainly focus on write workloads since they are more likely to cause
scalability problems. Unless otherwise specified, in our experiments each client
creates a file in its own directory, writes 192MB of data to it (as suggested by the
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HDFS developers in their white paper on how to test HDFS’ scalability [94]), closes
the file, and then starts a new file. This workload achieves the highest scalability
among all workloads that we tried; Section 4.5.1 describes the performance problems
caused by other workloads. We use a block size of 128MB and the default three-
way replication (again, as suggested in [94]). Unless otherwise specified, we run
DataNodes and clients in emulated mode while the NameNode runs in real mode.
For the above workload, Tardis achieves a compression ratio of over 500, but
in practice the degree of colocation is limited by CPU utilization: we colocate 100
DataNodes on one machine and achieve an effective write bandwidth of 10GB/sec on
a disk with 100MB/sec physical bandwidth. For experiments with modest storage
capacity requirements, we can increase the write bandwidth to 20GB/sec by writing
to tmpfs, an in-memory file system. Our largest configuration experiment uses 192
server machines, to emulate an HDFS cluster with 19,200 DataNodes.
HDFS throughput scalability
In some sense, the result of our experiments to test the scalability of HDFS is not sur-
prising: the bottleneck of the system is the centralized NameNode. What is perhaps
surprising is that, thanks to Exalt, we were able to increase the system throughput
by an order of magnitude without changing the architecture of the system.
Figure 4.3 reports the results of our experiments. On the x-axis we increase
the number of DataNodes and on the y-axis we plot the aggregate throughput of
the system, as observed by the clients. The vertical arrows represent the process of
fixing an issue that was limiting the system throughput. When an issue is fixed, we
rerun the experiment for the same number of DataNodes, to verify that the system
indeed achieves a higher throughput. For reference, we also plot a straight line that
shows the ideal throughput achievable by a perfectly scalable system that leverages
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Figure 4.3: HDFS throughput scalability.
Our first experiment shows that the original HDFS system quickly saturates
at around 37GB/s. We discovered through profiling that the default number of
RPC threads at the NameNode was limiting the achievable throughput; increasing
the number of RPC threads from 10 to 256 allows the NameNode to achieve much
higher throughput.
After fixing the first issue, the system saturates at around 286GB/s. Further
profiling showed that the I/O accesses at the NameNode were becoming the system
bottleneck. More specifically, the NameNode debug information was being stored
on the same disk as its log file, which, of course, hurts the speed of logging. Our
solution was to write the debug information to tmpfs instead, thereby making sure
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Memory size 1GB 2GB 4GB 8GB
HDFS Capacity 1.15PB 2.35PB 4.76PB 9.49PB
Table 4.1: HDFS space scalability as a function of NameNode memory size.
that the NameNode log file was accessing the disk with full speed. Alternatively,
one could store the debug information on another disk, if one were available.
Applying the second fix increases the system throughput to 418GB/s, at
which point the system again becomes saturated. This finding is consistent with the
scalability assessment of the HDFS developers that with each client having a write
throughput of 40MB/s, “10,000 writers can produce enough workload to saturate
the name-node” [94], which corresponds to an aggregate throughput of 400GB/s.
While this assessment was obtained using extrapolation, we consider it reasonably
accurate since it is based on a large deployment of 4,000 nodes.
Since we suspected disk I/O to be the system bottleneck at this point, we
performed a final experiment in which disk sync is disabled and the NameNode
writes all logs to tmpfs. The purpose of this experiment is to project the scalability
of the system in the presence of a fast storage medium (e.g. NVRAM, SSD). In this
configuration, the system throughput increases by a further 42%, to a maximum
throughput of 595GB/s.
Of course, we do not claim that Exalt’s throughput predictions are perfectly
accurate; on the contrary, we acknowledge the limitations of running a system whose
resources are partially emulated. Nonetheless, the benefits of Exalt are clear: it
allowed us to test the system’s real code and identify and resolve performance issues




The capacity of an HDFS cluster is limited by the amount of memory available
to the NameNode. In this experiment, we try to measure how much memory the
NameNode needs per 1PB of HDFS storage space. Table 4.1 shows that the capacity
of HDFS grows linearly with the amount of memory at the NameNode. In particular,
1GB of NameNode memory can support about 1.2PB of raw HDFS space (400TB
of data, since blocks are 3-way replicated). This result is close to the estimation of
HDFS developers: “1GB of metadata ≈ 1PB of physical storage” [94].
Using Exalt allows us to perform this experiment using only 16TB of disk
storage, while a real deployment would require a total of 10PB of disk storage.
Performance degradation in HDFS
The above experiments use a workload that provides high scalability. Other work-
loads are not as accommodating. We evaluate two such workloads that can drasti-
cally degrade the performance of HDFS.
In the first workload, all clients create files in the same directory. As shown
in Figure 4.4, the aggregate system throughput steadily decreases as more files
are created. Further profiling allowed us to identify the cause of this behavior in
the source code: the NameNode uses an ArrayList data structure to maintain an
alphabetically sorted list of the files inside a directory. Adding an element to a
sorted array is an O(N) operation, since it requires a suffix of the sorted array to
be shifted by one position. Therefore, the bigger the directory, the longer it takes
to add a file to it. As a double check, we verified that, if we limit the number
of files written to each directory, creating more files does not cause a performance
degradation.
In the second workload, one client creates a file and keeps appending data
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Figure 4.4: HDFS throughput degradation as the size of directories increases.
system throughput decreases steadily. Note that in this experiment there are only
a few clients and the system is not fully saturated, which accounts for the fact that
the aggregate system throughput is lower than in the previous experiment. Profiling
led us to the cause of the problem: before the NameNode creates a new block for
a file, it needs to calculate the file’s length. It does this by scanning all existing
blocks and computing the sum of the lengths of all blocks. This, too, is an O(N)
operation. We fixed this problem by adding a length field to each file and updating
the field when a block is added or updated. As Figure 4.5 shows, after applying our
fix the system throughput no longer decreases as the files grow in size.
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Figure 4.5: HDFS throughput degradation as the size of files increases.
quiring access to a large amount of disk storage. Running this experiment in a real
deployment would require 900TB of disk storage; with Exalt, we only need 1.5TB.
DataNode scalability
As disk capacities increase every year, and most HDFS deployments use multiple
disks per DataNode, it is important for the DataNode’s performance to not decrease
as more storage capacity is added to it. While running HDFS in hybrid mode—
keeping some DataNodes real—we observed uncommonly high latencies for some
requests. Our profiling indicated that the source of the problem was a disk scan that
the DataNode periodically performs on all its blocks. Figure 4.6 shows that the time
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a real node takes to perform this scan increases linearly with the number of blocks
stored on the disk. Unfortunately, this scan is a blocking operation, preventing write
requests and heartbeats from being sent or received. As the duration of this scan
becomes longer, it can have serious performance consequences, including timeouts at
the clients or even missed heartbeats, which would cause unnecessary re-replication
of the DataNode’s data. This issue is confirmed by Facebook engineers; to address
it, they modified HDFS to allow the block scan to be performed in parallel with
heartbeats and write requests [39].
While reproducing this problem is easy, triggering it in a real deployment
would require 8TB of disk storage on a single DataNode; using Exalt, we triggered
this problem using an 80GB disk. After identifying the problem, we reproduced it
on a real DataNode with 8TB of disk storage (Figure 4.6).
Note that although it could be triggered with only a few machines, this
problem would be hard to identify and tedious to reproduce during debugging, since
it would take at least a few hours for the latency increase to be observable. Exalt’s
time compression helps in this case. If emulated nodes have exclusive access to a
machine’s resources, the system works at an accelerated speed: in this example, the
problem would manifest itself in a matter of minutes.
4.5.2 HBase
HBase [12] is a distributed key-value store built upon HDFS. The basic data unit of
HBase is a region, which corresponds to a continuous key range in a table. An HBase
cluster includes a Master, responsible for assigning regions to different region servers.
Client requests to a specific region are directed to the corresponding region server.
The region server processes write requests by logging them to HDFS while also
keeping them in a memory buffer called memcache. When the size of the memcache
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Figure 4.6: Time of the block-scan procedure on a DataNode, as the number of
blocks increases.
file on HDFS, so that it can garbage-collect the previous log files. A checkpoint
is also taken if the total memory usage across all regions exceeds some limit; in
this case, a region server checkpoints the region with the largest memcache. When
necessary to free up space, the region server performs compaction to merge several
checkpoints. In essence, a region server transforms the random access patterns of a
key-value store into the append-only interface of HDFS. When a region grows large,
HBase splits that region into two for load balancing; conversely, if two adjacent
regions are too small, they are merged into one. Apart from the Master and the
region servers, an HBase cluster incorporates a ZooKeeper ensemble that performs
lease management.
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We evaluate HBase using a simple workload that can achieve a high through-
put: we create enough regions so that each region server stores about 10 regions.
We start multiple clients that randomly write key-value pairs to those regions. The
key size is 4 bytes and the value size is 1MB. To measure the maximum achievable
throughput, we disable split, merge, and compaction operations—to ensure that
split and merge operations do not occur, we limit the number of key-value pairs
written to a region. We plan to study the effects of split, merge, and compaction in
the future.
Our experiments keep the HBase Master, HDFS NameNode and ZooKeeper
cluster real, while all DataNodes and region servers are emulated. In each experi-
ment we assign 500MB of physical memory to region servers. However, we perform
in-memory compression, which effectively increases each region server’s memory to
16GB.
Figure 4.7 demonstrates the throughput scalability of HBase as the number
of available region servers increases. Note that the raw throughput of HBase is
much lower than that of HDFS (see Figure 4.3). This is due to two reasons: first,
HBase needs to write data twice to HDFS—once for logging and once for check-
pointing. Second, region servers are relatively more CPU-intensive than DataNodes
and therefore cannot benefit as much from colocating multiple nodes on the same
machine.
HBase can achieve a maximum write throughput of about 80GB/s. Consid-
ering that HBase writes data twice, this translates to a 160GB/s throughput at the
HDFS layer, which is about 40% of the maximum throughput achievable by HDFS.
Our profiling shows that the sync calls to disk at the HDFS NameNode are still
the bottleneck of the system. The reason for this 60% performance loss is that the
region servers perform many additional directory operations, other than simply cre-
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Figure 4.7: HBase throughput scalability.
server first moves it to an “old log” directory as a backup and only deletes it after
some time has elapsed.
In Figure 4.7 each region server has 16GB of memory and holds 10 regions:
since the default maximum size of a region is 200MB, all data can be cached in mem-
ory. Our next experiment evaluates how the performance of HBase is affected when
we decrease the memory size per region. As shown in Figure 4.8, HBase throughput
drops significantly when the number of regions per GB of memory exceeds 7, which
translates to about 150MB of memory per region. In other words, in order for HBase
to work efficiently in a large-scale deployment, each region server must be equipped
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Figure 4.8: HBase aggregate throughput as the number of regions per GB of
memory changes.
data. The reason for this performance drop is that region servers flush their regions
to HDFS files when their memory usage exceeds a certain threshold. If the number
of regions per GB of memory is high, this will create a large number of small files
on HDFS, which stresses the HDFS NameNode. Resolving this problem requires a
significant redesign of HBase, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Note
that this performance drop is only observed at large scales, since small deployments
cannot generate enough load to saturate the HDFS NameNode.
Our last experiment explores the effect of writing small values on the colo-





















Figure 4.9: Colocation ratio of Exalt.
colocation ratios when the value sizes are large (around 500KB), but does not fare
equally well for small values. It is worth noting that the achievable colocation ra-
tio for a given workload is not infinite; eventually CPU utilization becomes the
bottleneck. For HBase, this happens at a colocation ratio of about 110.
4.5.3 Case Study: Cassandra
Cassandra [60] borrows many elements from Amazon’s Dynamo storage system.
Unlike HDFS and HBase, Cassandra does not rely on a single metadata node to
manage namespace and membership. Instead, Cassandra incorporates a distributed
hashtable (DHT) protocol for these tasks, eliminating the single scalability bottle-
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neck. Although one might expect this design choice to result in better scalability, our
experience applying Exalt to Cassandra shows that this expectation is unfounded:
the scalability problems of Cassandra appear at the scale of hundreds of nodes, even
before we turn on Tardis compression.
We find two major problems preventing Cassandra from scaling up to tens of
thousands of nodes. First, if multiple nodes concurrently join an existing Cassandra
cluster, there is a non-negligible possibility that some of them may fail. This problem
was confirmed by the developer of Cassandra behind the pseudonym geekatcmu
who, when asked about the issue, wrote to us that: “you have to wait for each
node to bootstrap before starting the next one” [24]. As a result, starting a cluster
with tens of thousands of nodes may take prohibitively long, both in practice and
in experiments, because a node usually takes several minutes to stabilize. This
problem is actually rooted in the design of DHTs, where it is usually hard to provide
a consistent namespace when a large number of nodes are joining or leaving.
The second problem is that the number of threads per node grows quickly
with the scale of the cluster. This is because, in the current implementation, each
Cassandra node creates four sockets—incoming and outcoming sockets for both
data and metadata streams—to every other Cassandra node, and assigns a separate
thread to each socket. In our experiments, the number of threads created quickly
hit the system limit, which we didn’t have sufficient privileges to change. Even
if we had, the large number of threads would have created a memory problem:
given that the stack of a thread takes at least 128KB4 of memory in the JVM, in
a cluster of 10,000 nodes, each node would need at least 5GB of memory just for
creating threads. This problem may be addressed with an implementation using
Non-blocking I/O (NIO), which creates a single thread for all sockets.
In sum, for the current implementation of Cassandra, trying to deploy a
4This number may vary depending on hardware architecture and operating system.
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cluster with more than 1000 nodes is not suggested, as the developer of Cassandra
behind the pseudonym geekatcmu remarked when we asked him to comment on our
findings [24]: indeed, the scalability of Cassandra is so limited that these problems
can be observed even without the help of Exalt.
4.6 Conclusion
Exalt is a library that gives back to researchers the ability to evaluate the scalability
of large storage systems. Exalt is based on the Tardis compression scheme, which
leverages a specific data format to achieve efficient compression and high degrees
of colocation, which in turn allows researchers to perform large-scale experiments
on as few as one hundred machines. We have used Exalt to identify several perfor-
mance problems in HDFS and HBase. Fixing these problems allowed the system to




5.1 Separating data and metadata
Separating data and metadata is an old but effective idea adopted by multiple
systems for different goals. This section only describes how it is used in storage
systems to provide better robustness.
Many storage systems apply stronger protection to metadata and weaker
protection to data because metadata, if damaged, could potentially cause any data,
even the whole storage system, to become unavailable or corrupted; the effect of
damaged data, however, is usually contained in the data item (e.g. a file) itself.
Therefore, local filesystems such as the EXT series [2] and ZFS [88] keep multiple
copies of the superblock and inodes on disks while keeping fewer copies of data;
distributed storage systems such as Farsite [5] and Windows Azure Storage [23] apply
strong replication (BFT and Paxos respectively) to its namespace metadata while
using primary backup to minimize the cost of data. These systems usually achieve
stronger guarantees on metadata but weaker guarantees on data. My dissertation,
however, shows that with properly designed metadata, data as well can also be
protected with strong guarantees and little additional cost.
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Paris et al. [85] reduce the storage overhead of voting using volatile witnesses.
Yin et al. [109] separate agreement from execution to reduce the number of execution
nodes required for Byzantine replication, showing that while 3f + 1 nodes are still
required for agreement, 2f + 1 nodes are enough for execution, and Clement et
al. [31] refine these techniques. Gnothi and Salus both adopt similar ideas but with
further improvements: Gnothi shows that the replication cost of execution in the
failure free case can be further reduced to approximately f +1 by performing partial
replication of data and full replication of metadata; Salus’ active storage protocol
shows that the replication cost of agreement can also be reduced to f + 1 under
certain conditions (e.g. single writer per volume).
5.2 Robustness techniques
Three techniques are commonly used to protect a storage system against failures:
replication, end-to-end checks, and erasure coding.
5.2.1 Replication
Tolerating omission failures Replication techniques used to tolerate omission
failures can be classified as either synchronous or asynchronous.
In synchronous replication [20,21,34], a primary replica provides the service
to the clients, and if the primary replica fails, a backup replica takes over and
continues to provide service. It takes f+1 replicas to tolerate f crash failures. There
are three main disadvantages to synchronous primary backup [19]: 1) its correctness
is not guaranteed when there are timing errors caused by network partitions or
server overloading, since these faults can cause replicas to diverge; 2) to minimize
correctness issues, the system must be configured with conservative timeouts that
can hurt availability; 3) read throughput is limited by the capability of a single
machine, since only the primary replica processes requests.
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Asynchronous replication does not assume an upper bound on network la-
tency or node response time, and hence can ensure correctness even in the face of
relatively rare events like server overload, network overload, or network partitions.
The traditional approach to asynchronous replication involves a Replicated State
Machine (RSM), in which a consensus protocol guarantees that each correct replica
receives the same sequence of requests and in which each replica is a deterministic
state machine.
Paxos [61, 62] is representative of the asynchronous RSM approach, which
requires 2f + 1 replicas to tolerate f crash failures. Paxos guarantees safety (all
correct replicas receive the same sequence of requests) at all times and guarantees
liveness (the system can make progress) when the network is available and node
actions and message delivery are timely. Paxos uses timeouts internally, but it does
not depend on their accuracy for safety and can adjust timeouts dynamically for
liveness.
The standard Paxos protocol executes every request on each of the 2f + 1
replicas, with costs (in bandwidth, storage space, etc.) higher than synchronous
replication. Much work has been done to reduce the cost of Paxos: Gaios does not log
reads, executes them on only one replica, and nonetheless guarantees linearizabilty
by adding new messages to the original Paxos protocol [19]. ZooKeeper [54] includes
a fast read protocol that executes on a single replica, but it does not provide Paxos’s
linearizability guarantee.
On-demand instantiation (ODI) [63] reduces write costs by executing re-
quests on a preferred quorum of f + 1 replicas. If one of the active replica fails, a
backup replica is activated, but before it can start processing any request it must be
initialized by fetching the current value of all replicated state. In storage systems
with large amounts of data, this approach does not scale, as the system can be
unavailable for hours while it transfers terabytes of data.
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Falcon [67] uses an accurate failure detector to eliminate the necessity of
asynchronous replication, but it relies on the availability of all the network switches,
an assumption that may not always hold in today’s datacenters: a rack of machines
together with its switch may be turned off for maintenance or fail unexpectedly, and
large-scale storage systems should be designed to remain available in this case [42,
44, 77, 95]. Indeed, the authors of Falcon explicitly acknowledged the significant
technical challenge involved in network failure localization [67].
Tolerating arbitrary failures Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) replication is
the standard technique to tolerate arbitrary failures. It can also be classified as
either synchronous or asynchronous, and their relationship is similar to the pair
described in the previous paragraph.
Synchronous BFT systems [16,64] take 3f +1 replicas to tolerate f arbitrary
failures, while asynchronous BFT systems [26,31,59] also take 3f +1 replicas (2f +1
for execution) but, similar to Paxos, can only guarantee liveness during synchronous
intervals. Several BFT systems [4,33] incorporate more replicas to optimize latency
or throughput.
On-demand instantiation (ODI) is also applied in BFT techniques [108], but
it suffers from the same problem that if a replica fails, the system is unavailable
for a long time to wait for the data copy to complete. Distler et al. [38] propose
to alleviate this problem by replaying a per-object log on demand, but again this
approach is not appropriate for replicating applications with large amounts of state,
because its logs and snapshots are on a per-object basis; to reduce overhead, per-
object garbage collection is performed infrequently, once every 100 updates, which
means that the system stores 100 copies of each object at each replica.
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5.2.2 End-to-end checks
ZFS [3] incorporates an on-disk Merkle tree to protect the file system from disk
corruptions. SFSRO [43], SUNDR [69], Depot [73], and Iris [96] also use end-to-end
checks to guard against faulty servers. However, none of these systems is designed
to scale to thousands of machines, because, to support multiple clients sharing a
volume, they depend on a single server to update the Merkle tree. Instead, Salus
is designed for a single client per volume, so it can rely on the client to update the
Merkle tree and make the server side scalable. We do not claim this to be a major
novelty of Salus; we see this as an example of how different goals lead to different
designs.
We are not aware of any end-to-end verification techniques that can support
multiple writers while achieving strong consistency, scalability, and end-to-end veri-
fication for read requests. One can tune Salus to support multiple writers by either
using a single server to serialize requests to a volume as shown in SUNDR [69],
which of course hurts scalability, or by using weaker consistency models like Fork-
Join-Casual [73] or fork* [40].
End-to-end checks alone only provide safety guarantees but do not provide
any durability or availability guarantees: an error can be detected by end-to-end
checks, but how to recover from such an error remains unknown. That is why in dis-
tributed systems, end-to-end checks are often used in combination with replication
to provide all the desired properties, and Salus adopts the same principle.
5.2.3 Erasure coding
Erasure coding [37,51,53] is another popular technique to protect data in distributed
systems. It splits the raw data into multiple blocks and then codes them into a
new set of blocks so that as long as a certain number of the new blocks survive the
failures, the raw data can be reconstructed. Compared to replication, erasure coding
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makes different tradeoffs: first, erasure coding uses more CPU resource, but usually
requires less storage space to provide the same level of durability guarantee; second,
erasure coding usually requires more network bandwidth to recover a lost block
since many blocks need to be read to reconstruct the lost block; third, replication
can usually provide better read throughput because reads can be directed to any of
the replicas, while erasure coding doesn’t have this advantage. All such tradeoffs
make erasure coding an attractive option for cold data [57,68]—data that is written
once and rarely accessed in the future—for which space is more of a concern than
performance. This dissertation mainly focuses on hot replicated data, but several of
the techniques we discuss, such as Salus’ pipelined commit protocol and end-to-end
verification, do not depend on how data is protected and thus should work with
storage systems that use erasure coding.
5.3 Scalability techniques
5.3.1 Scalable and consistent storage
Sharding—breaking a storage space into multiple units (e.g. blocks, files, and key-
value pairs) and assigning these units to different servers—is used in almost any
large storage systems to scale them to more than thousands of servers. One of the
key challenges is how to maintain membership, tracking which servers a data unit
has been assigned to.
Many large-scale storage systems [5,12,23,27,44,70] rely on a single (maybe
replicated) metadata server to keep membership information. This approach is easy
to design and implement, but suffers from the scalability problem that the single
metadata server can become the bottleneck. On the other hand, systems like Cassan-
dra [60] rely on a distributed hashtable (DHT) to maintain membership, eliminating
the single bottleneck but suffering from another problem that the hashtable might
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become inconsistent when a large number of nodes are joining or leaving. In the
middle ground, several systems [10,41,107] use a group of metadata servers, instead
of only one, to maintain membership, making a tradeoff between complexity and
scalability.
Few such systems are designed to tolerate arbitrary node failures: while these
systems usually use checksums to safeguard data written on disk, a memory corrup-
tion or a software glitch can lead to the loss of data in these systems (Section 3.4.1).
In contrast, Salus is designed to be robust (safe and live) even if nodes fail arbitrarily.
5.3.2 Evaluating scalability
As we mentioned earlier, two common approaches to evaluating the scalability of
large storage systems are using extrapolation and stub components. For exam-
ple, extrapolation is used, among others, in RAMCloud [84], Spanner [32], and
Salus [106], while the stub approach is used in HDFS [94,95]. Section 4.1 discusses
these approaches in detail, so we do not discuss them further here.
Several tools have been proposed to address the gap between the size of the
experiments that researchers would like to run and the resources available to them.
In DieCast [48] this experimental gap is addressed using time dilation [49].
DieCast runs multiple processes inside virtual machines on a single host and slows
down each process by a constant factor. It compensates for this slow-down by
multiplying the measured throughput by the same factor. DieCast can achieve
some degree of colocation when CPU utilization is the bottleneck, but does nothing
to reduce the large amount of disk space necessary to evaluate large-scale storage
systems.
The system that comes closer to addressing the experimental gap for storage
systems is David [6]. David leverages the observation that to evaluate a local file
system it is not necessary to store the actual data. Thus, David only stores the file
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system’s metadata: the data is simply discarded. This technique allows David to
evaluate local file systems of much larger size than that of the local disk on which
they are run. Unfortunately, this approach cannot be easily applied to distributed
storage services. For example, when users write a key-value pair to HBase, the
region server adds a timestamp and a region identifier to the write request and
stores this metadata, together with the users’ data, on the local file system of an
HDFS DataNode. Since data and metadata look indistinguishable to the HDFS
layer, David would discard metadata critical for the correct operation of the system.
Memulator [46] emulates nonexistent storage components by storing data in
memory and accurately predicting how long each operation takes. Its purpose is to
test the behavior of the system on devices that the researchers do not have access
to. Unlike Exalt, it does not save any resource usage, which makes it not applicable
to our goal.
Finally, simulation is a technique used by several systems to evaluate the per-
formance of large-scale deployments. The approaches vary from disk simulation [98],
network simulation [79, 83], to simulation of scheduling and checkpointing in large
platforms [103, 110]. A well-known drawback of simulation is that its results are
only as good as its model of how the system works. Unfortunately, as systems grow
in complexity, coming up with a model that accurately captures all their features
becomes prohibitively hard.
There exist several compression algorithms [29,76,80,111,112] one may con-
sider using in our context. However, all these algorithms are designed to be general-
purpose and as such they need to scan all the input bytes. Tardis, on the other





This dissertation shows that, by utilizing the idea of separating data from metadata,
a storage system can achieve strong robustness guarantees with little impact on
efficiency and scalability. This dissertation demonstrates the power of this idea by
applying it to three very different systems.
I have learned several lessons during my work. First, the general belief
that stronger protection is more expensive, which is often proved to be true in a
theorem, may not be an insuperable obstacle when coming to real systems: real
systems are often complex and may deviate from the general model to which the
theorem applies in subtle ways, opening up new opportunities for optimizations.
Finding such opportunities usually requires a deep understanding of the theorem
itself, and in particular its assumptions.
Second, when calculating the cost of a protection technique, what really
matters is its cost in the failure-free case, because this is the most common scenario:
optimizing cost in the failure-free case is the key in both Gnothi and Salus, and their
costs in the presence of failures are actually not different from those of previous
works. Although this is not a new insight, two things are worth noting: first, the
replication thresholds proved in different theorems (e.g. 2f + 1 for asynchronous
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replication) often apply to worst-case scenarios, which might be misleading to some
extent. Second, optimizing the failure-free case should not significantly hurt the
availability of the system when failures occur: ensuring this property is exactly the
key factor that distinguishes Gnothi from previous works.
Finally, although the size of metadata is small, how to process metadata still
requires careful thoughts. For example, caching all metadata in memory can cause
memory overhead while storing it to disks may cause random disk accesses: neither
option is desirable. My experience in working on this dissertation suggests that
identifying an effective way to reduce the overhead of processing metadata usually
requires a significant engineering effort.
In conclusion, strong protection of data does not have to be expensive. Many
systems that are making a tradeoff between robustness and scalability can actually
enjoy the benefits of both, as long as we can design and protect metadata properly.
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